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ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT: 



CONCISE EXPLANATIONS 

OF THE 

> PRINCIPAL TERMS EMPLOYED IN THE SEVERAL BRANCHES 
I OF 



INTELLECTUAL- PjULQ^PHY. 



1 S A A (j /r A im»^t,j 



Nee niaiuis nuda, nee Intel lectus 
Sibi permissus, mulUmi valet. 



SECOND AMERICAN ^ 

FROM THE NINTH LONDON EDITION. 




NEW YORK : 
WILLIAM GOWANS 

1851. 



^4 




R. CRAIGHEAD, PRINTER AND STEREOTYPER, 
112 FULTON STREET. 



PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. 



The design of this volume is to impart, in a familiar form, 
elementary explanations and instructions on subjects connected 
with the intellectual faculties ; to • afford gradual and easy 
exercises to the powers of abstraction ; and thus to conduct 
the young reader, by an accessible path, into that region of 
thought where the mind acquires force, accuracy, and com- 
prehension. 

A writer who invites the attention of young persons to 
subjects which demand a continued effort of thought, is 
tempted to win that attention by some promise of amuse- 
ment; or to profess that he has the art of communicating 
knowledge without the cost of labor on the part of those who 
receive it. No such promise or profession can be ofiered in 
the present instance. The author believes that when the 
object intended is to give tone and vigor to the understanding 
by exertion, trivial digressions and gaieties of style should be 
avoided. Relaxation from efforts of attention is perhaps 
always better provided for away from books than in thera ; or 
at least it should be entirely disjoined from serious studies. 

The writer, therefore, does not treat his young readers as 
children, who must be allured by the promise of entertain- 
ment to advance in the course of mental improvement, and 
to whom knowledge must be administered, hke a nauseous 
drug concealed in a sweetmeat. On the contrary, he boldly 
claims their undiverted attention ; he invites them to think, 



IV PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. 

and suggests no inducements besides the proper pleasures and 
advantages of intellectual cultivation. He has indeed endea- 
vored to make this introduction to the study of the mind as 
familiar and intelligible as possible, and has presumed upon 
no higher qualifications in his young reader than an ordinary 
measure of inteUigence — a moderate proficiency in the several 
branches of education, together with a deliberate and efficient 
desire for the improvement of the mind. 

In explanation of the form into which these elementary 
instructions are thrown, it may be proper to say, that the 
writer has been guided by the opinion that comprehensive 
and systematical books are little adapted to the purpose of 
initiation in studies of the kind to which this volume relates, 
A treatise on any branch of intellectual philosophy, if it be 
complete and systematical, must include many topics which 
no simplicity or perspicuity of style can render easily compre- 
hensible. One portion of the book may be readily under- 
stood, while another portion, though not less lucid in its style, 
may baffle the efforts of the unexercised faculties ; and thus 
perhaps may occasion to the youthful reader final discourage- 
ment and disgust. The writer, therefore, has not aimed to 
compose regular elements either of Metaphysics or of Logic, 
beheving that the first book which is put into the hands of 
a young person with the view of inviting his attention to 
objects purely intellectual, should be rather select than com- 
prehensive in its topics. 



ADVERTISEMENT 

TO THE NINTH EDITION 



In sending this little volume again to the press, after the 
lapse of several years, the author has been induced to rewrite 
it ; and although he has retained portions of the original 
work, has superseded more, and has thrown the whole into a 
new form. 

The volume is now offered to the public, first, as 

A BOOK OF REFERENCE, 

to which recourse may be had by those who are not fully and 
familiarly conversant with Intellectual Philosophy, when 
explanation is needed of those abstract and scientific words 
which occur in the course of reading the best authors, and 
which find a place, more or less frequently, in the conversation 
of the educated classes. It is especially with a view to facili- 
tate this use of the book, that the articles have been placed 
in alphabetic order. 

The author has, furthermore, borne in view the advantage 
of those, who, although neither their tastes nor their oppor- 
tunities may admit of their engaging in the study of Intel- 
lectual Philosophy, or of their perusing larger works, would 



ADVERTISEMENT 

gladly acquire some general knowledge of these subjects, 
such as should be at once correct, precise, and easily retained. 
The author is not aware that any modern work, except his 
own, is to be met with adapted to the use of the class of 
readers he is now speaking of; and he has especially endea- 
vored to suit his style to the range of such persons. The 
method he recommeds them to pursue, in avaihng themselves 
of his labors, is, after perusing the preliminary synthetical 
explanation of terms, to read each article of the vocabulary in 
the order in which it occurs in the synthesis ; by which means 
the whole will present itself as a connected system (though 
brief indeed) of the three principal branches of Intellectual 
Study, and so form a compendious 

SUMMARY OF MENTAL SCIENCE. 

There is yet another, and a very important purpose to 
which the author would fain believe his little volume may be 
Ibund applicable ; he means that of catechetical instruction 
in schools on these subjects, indispensable as they are to 
a good education. The book is therefore explicitly oftered 
to Tutors and Teachers as 

A CLASS BOOK OF PHILOSOPHIC THEMES ; 

and without presuming to dictate to those whose experience 
in the arduous business of education quahfies them to select 
the most efficient and practicable methods of instruction, the 
author suggests, that each pupil, having first been directed in 
what way to avail himself of the prefixed synthesis of terms, 
as a means of bringing together the several articles that are 
naturally related one to the other, should then (the books 
being laid aside) express, in writing, his sense of each article, 
and that, after a short interval, the class should be ques- 
tioned on the chief points of the three branches of Intellectual 



TO THE NINTH EDITION. Vll 

Science ; as, for example, the Teacher asks for a definition of 
MIND, as distinguished from matter ; he next inquires what 
correspondence mind has with matter, and by what means, 
namely, the senses for perception, and the nervous muscular 
system for the exertion of its innate power of resisting and 
moving matter. He goes on to interrogate on the difference 
of those several states of the mind which connect it with the 
external world ; and in doing so will find it easy to render 
the subject at once intelligible and attractive by illustrations 
readily drawn from famihar experience, or from the regions 
of poetry. 

A single branch of any of these subjects may be quite 
enough to fill the portion of time allotted to the exercise ; or 
the rule might be to assume the words belonging to one 
paragraph of the synthesis as the materials of each catecheti- 
cal lecture. Thus, for instance, the terms of physical science 
(page 12) would be explained on one occasion, those belong- 
ing to the proof of historical facts (pages 12 and 13) on 
another ; and again the phrases of argumentation at a differ- 
ent time. 

The author will only subjoin a hint to the Teacher on the 
importance of imparting to the pupil, and of maintaining in 
his own mind, a clear conception of the essential independ- 
ency and dissimilarity of those three branches of study, 
namely — the science of the mind, or its Physiology — Meta- 
phyics, or the philosophy of abstraction — and Logic, or the 
science and art of acquiring and communicating knowledge ; 
since from confounding these subjects, not only does the mind 
lose itself in endless obscurities, but is liable to practical 
mistakes, in matters of opinion, which are easily avoided if 
the distinction be kept in view. 

Without attributing a paramount importance to the culti- 
vation of Intellectual Science — physical or abstract — it may 



Vm ADVERTISEMENT TO THE NINTH EDITION. 

fairly be affirmed, that a well conducted and early initiation 
in this branch of philosophy secures a mental advantage of 
great practical value ; and which, if it were generally possessed, 
would go far in accelerating the universal diffusion of the 
highest Truths. 

November, 1833. 



SYNTHESIS, 



SYSTEMATIC VIEW OF THE TERMS EXPLAINED 
IN THIS VOLUME. 



The terms employed in the several departments 
of abstract and mental science are readily 
separable into Three Classes : — 

The First Class, containing those which 
belong to the Physiology of the human Mind ; 
and which designate its several faculties, and 
modes of feeling, and acting ; such, for example, 
as sensation, emotion, iinagination, 8^c, 

The Second Class comprehends those terms 
which represent purely abstract notions, such as 
essence, extension, space, power, substance, mode, 
8^c., and which belong to Metaphysics. 

The Third Class are those that express the 
operations of the Mind,' its methods, and its 
artificial processes, in acquiring and in com- 
municating knowledge. These terms belong 
to Logic. 

1 



We have therefore before us — 
1st. Mental Philosophy, which treats of the 
nature of the Mhid ; 

2d. Metaphysics, or the science of Abstrac- 
tion ; 

3d. Logic, or the method of gaining know- 
ledge for ourselves, and of conveying it to 
others. 



CLASS L 

TERMS BELONGING TO THE PHYSIOLOGY OF 
THE MIND. 

The Mind is that which feels, and knows, 
and thinks ; or which is conscious of existence ; 
and is distinguished from Matter, which 
affects the mind through the senses ; and is 
moved by the voluntary effort of the mind, 
exerted through the muscles. 

That Consciousness of existence wliich 
belongs to the mind, and which extends with- 
out interruption from one period of life to 
another, imparts the notion and conviction of 
personal Identity. 

The human Mind is distinguished from the 
brute mind, not only by the greater extent of 
its faculties, and especially of the faculty of 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

abstraction ; but by its being guided, in almost 
all its operations, by its knowledge of the 
connexion of cause and effect : whereas, 
animals are more often guided bj an unknown 
influence, called Instinct, than by any calcula- 
tion of means, as conducing to an end ; or by 
a knowledge of consequences. The words 
Reason and Instinct are used to express this 
important difference between man and animals. 
Whenever the state of the mind is changed by 
some cause exterior to itself it is said to be the 
subject of an Impression. 

The Mind is conscious of impressions from 
the external world through the organs of sight, 
hearing, taste, smell, and touch : changes in its 
feehngs, so produced, are called Sensations ; 
and when two or more sensations, coming from 
the same object, through different senses, lead 
the Mind to think of that object as an external 
cause of its feehngs, it is said to perceive, or to 
have a Perception. The recalling of a former 
perception, or sensation, is Conception. The 
mental image, so recalled, is an Idea ; and is 
distinguished from a Notion, which is a 
thought, purely mental or abstract. 

Independently of any act or effort of the 
mind, there is incessantly going on within it a 
Succession of Ideas or emotioDS : and these 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

ideas follow each other in consequence of some 
circumstance of real connexion, or of accidental 
relationship. This is called the Association 
OF Ideas. In other words, there is a something 
in each thought which brings some other before 
the mind ; this is Suggestion. When foruier 
perceptions or emotions recur to the mind, 
attended bj circumstances of time and placed 
we are said to remember; and the power of 
remembering is Memory. 

The power which the mind possesses, not 
only o{ recalling ideas, or of having conceptions, 
but of separating such conceptions, and of 
recomposing them in new modes, is Imagina- 
tion. 

Besides impressions from the external world, 
received through the senses, the mind is Hable 
to feelings which arise from the several organs 
and functions of the body, such as its Appetites, 
and other corporeal sensations. It is moreover 
subject to states of feeling which, though 
belonging to the Mind, never take place with- 
out, at the same time, affecting the body, either 
in a gentler or a more violent degree : these 
feelings are called Emotions; such as love, 
hatred, fear, ivonder, S^c. 

When the Mind acts in bringing together, 
comparing, or separating its ideas, or notions, 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 

it exerts its Intellectual powers. The 
emotion or desire to know, which is the imme- 
diate cause o[' this exertion, produces a con- 
tinuance of certain ideas or notions in the mind, 
longer than they would continue in the ordinary 
course of the succession of ideas. This act, 
producing continued thought, is Attention. 

If two or more objects or ideas are compared, 
and the relation between them is instantly 
perceived, the Mind is said to know by Intui- 
tion. When, either by such intuition, or by 
continued attention, the relation between two 
ideas is perceived, we are said to Apprehend. 

Single properties, or sensible qualities of 
bodies, or the parts of complex notions, are 
thought of separately and apart from all other 
properties, by the power of Abstraction. This 
power is the principal distinction of the human 
Mind. The power of considering the qualities 
of things apart, leads to the process of com- 
bining them in new forms, called Invention. 

Two or more objects or notions are detained 
before the Mind, and are compared the one 
with the other, and their agreement, or disa- 
greement, or relative proportion, is ascertained 
by the faculty of Judgment. 

Reasoning, is the bringing together a series 
of things, or notions, which are found to be 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

successively dependent one upon the other, or 
between which there exists a real connexion. 

The principal states and operations of the 
human Mind, considered in the simplest form, 
and apart from all the diversities, and peculiari- 
ties, and accidents to which, in individual cases, 
it is liable, are designated by the above-named 
terms. 

CLASS II. 

ABSTRACT OF METAPHYSICAL TERMS. 

The notions which are the subject of the 
science called Metaphysics, all result from the 
faculty of Abstraction ; as, for example, when 
various objects are perceived, and compared, . 
which agree in form, we think of form apart 
from colour, hardness, S^c, and then think of the 
several sorts of form, or figure ; as rounds 
square, &^c. And in the same way the notions 
of the mind are separated, and compared, and 
analysed, and combined. These abstract 
notions, as they are less instantly inteUigible, or 
less readily compared than sensible images, are 
often called Abstruse. 

From our own consciousness, after separating 
from it all idea or recollection of particular states, 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 

or emotions, we derive the simple abstract notion 
of Existence ; otherwise called Being. 

All the sensible and inseparable properties of 
anything, thought of together, constitute its 
Nature, or Essence ; and we think of this 
nature, as containing a hidden something, called 
Substance ; which supports or sustains, first, 
its Primary qualities, or those essential to it ; 
and then its Secondary qualities, which are 
imagined to be separable. 

These qualities are the Modes, or Affec- 
tions, or Attributes, or Adjuncts, or Acci- 
dents, of the substance in which they are found. 
The entire collection of properties belonging 
to a substance forms the Aggregate. 1 he 
qualities spoken of as so associated are Con- 
crete ; and a being, or a notion, consisting of 
parts or qualities that may be abstracted (in idea) 
one from the other, is Complex. 

The thinking of two things or notions 
together, comparing the one with the other, gives 
the notion of Relation ; which may be the 
relation of Agree?ne7it, or of Difference, or of 
Proportion, or of Power. 

The thought of a quality as present, or as 
removed, and absent, suggests the relative notions 
of Positive and Negative modes. 

The acquaintance which the mind gains with 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 

matter, by its own sensations, leads it to form 
a notion from which all particular forms, colors, 
and other variable qualities, are withdrawn, and 
which we call Extension. Removing again 
from this notion all idea of the sensible proper- 
ties of matter, we acquire the simple abstract 
notion of Space. By a similar process our 
general consciousness of continued existence, 
apart from particular events, suggests the notion 
of Duration. Extension or duration, without 
limit, is Infinite. 

The consciousness which the Mind has of 
its ability to control its own states, and to move 
the body, gives the notion of Power, Whatever 
possesses, or is supposed to possess Power, is 
called Active : that which is acted upon is 
Passive. That which exerts Power, or which 
by a natural prejudice, is thought to exert 
power, is a cause ; and the change produced is 
an Effect. Cause and Effect, thought of as 
simply connected in time, are called Antece- 
dent, and consequent. Where a similar order 
of causes is supposed to exist in different classes 
of beings, the resemblance or sameness is ex- 
pressed by the word Analogy. 

Power, operating without restraint,is Liberty. 
The existence of restraint ; or, as sometimes, the 
infallible connexion of causes and effects, is 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

called Necessity, and is opposed to Contin- 
gency; which means the absence of any real 
or settled connexion of causes and effects. 

When the established order of causes and 
effects is calculated upon, and causes are put in 
operation with an express view to obtain the 
effects they will produce, this intelligent exercise 
of power is Design. Supposed connexions of 
cause and effect, thought of as contradictory, or 
absurd ; or not so, give the notions of Possi- 
bility, and Impossibility. An effect w^iich 
will not take place, unless a certain cause is 
assumed as present, is Conditional. 

This synthesis of abstract terms might be 
enlarged, almost without end; but it is here 
purposely confined to the few which are either 
of principal importance, or which most frequently 
occur in metaphysical discussions. 

CLASS III. 

LOGICAL TERMS. 

Truths which are not intuitively perceived, 
must be ascertained by successive efforts of the 
mind : or when ascertained, must be communi- 
cated to others in successive portions. These 
methods of thinking and of discoursing, together 



10 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

with the states of the mind in relation to the 
subjects of its knowledge, are designated by the 
following terms, which may be arranged under 
four heads : — 1st. Those which belong to the 
separation and sorting of ideas or notions. 2d. 
Those that relate to the discovery of the laws 
of nature, and belong to physical science. 3d. 
The terms that are connected with the proof of 
historical facts. 4th. The terms of reasoning 
by the statement of successive propositions. 

]st. Terms of separation and sorting, and 
which belong in part to the discovery, but more 
to the conveyance and preservation of know- 
ledge. 

Generally, any placing of multifarious things 
in sets or in series, for the ease of the mind in 
thinking, or in learning, is Method; of which 
Order is either the means, or the end, according 
to the sense in which that word is understood. 
The least artificial kind of method is that of 
mere Division ; which reduces many to a few 
parcels. But if many things are sorted with 
some reference (more or less accurate) to their 
real differences, then the sorting is called an 
Arrange MEMT (in reference to things) ; or a 
Disposition (in reference to thoughts). After 
an arrangement has been planned, the things for 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 11 

which it is intended are assigned to their places 
by Distribution. 

A more exact or philosophical sorting of 
things or notions, is effected, first by an effort 
of abstraction which, when completed, in relation 
to a complex body or notion, is an Analysis. 
After an analysis has been completed the parts 
or qualities which have been taken asunder, 
may be re-composed : this is Synthesis. 

When organized bodies (especially) which in 
some things are alike, and in some unlike, are 
sorted according: to their resemblances and 
differences, the process is Classification. The 
larger sets or sorts are genera; and the smaller 
species. Words representing many individuals 
sorted together, are common teRiMs. A question 
concerning the objects of common terms, gave 
rise to the distinction of Nominal and Real. 

A Definition is the naming of the larger 
sort, or genus, to which any thing belongs; and 
then of that Difference which is the Distinc- 
tion, between it, and others of the same genus. 
To mention more differences than is essential 
to a Definition, is to give a Description. 

2d. The principal terms employed in relation 
to the discovery of the laws of nature, or the 
terms of physical science, fire these : — • 



12 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

Any natural fact or event, considered as an 
object of philosophical curiosity, is a Pheno- 
menon ; or facts known, and which are to be 
explained, are Data. The supposition formed 
concerning the cause of a phenomenon, is an 
Hypothesis. A complete set or system of such 
suppositions, is a Theory. A trial made for 
the purpose of discovering the cause of an effect, 
and which is guided by some hypothesis, is an 
Experiment. The inferring of general facts, 
or the laws of nature, from many particular facts, 
is Induction ; and the expressing or sorting of 
such laws is Generalization. General and 
well-established truths, in matters of natural phi- 
losophy, are Science. Special truths, appUed 
to human industry, constitute an Art. 

3d. The terms belonging to the proof of his- 
torical or particular facts, are these : — 

The subject of enquiry is — a Fact, or actual 
event, not known to us by personal observation. 
In support of the affirmation that such an event 
has taken place, w^e seek for Evidence, which 
may be either human Testimony, or other facts, 
whence an inference may be drawn, bearing 
upon the matter in question. If this evidence 
is conclusive, it produces Belief: or if insuffi- 
cient, Doubt : and then the fact has attached 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 13 

to it, in our minds, the idea of Probability, or 
the reverse. 

If the matter in question be rather an abstract 
principle, than a matter of historical fact, it is 
estabhshed by Argument ; or if susceptible of 
absolute proof, by Demonstration. The con- 
viction produced by good argument is Opinion : 
or if that conviction be influenced by improper 
motives, it is Prejudice. A deceptive or un- 
sound argument, is a Fallacy ; and if employed 
for the purpose of deluding those to whom it is 
addressed, it is a Sophism. 

4th. The terms employed in establishing a 
truth by the real connexion of a series of propo- 
sitions, or Reasoning, are these : — 

That which is the object of the process is 
Truth. Truths when so evident as to be in- 
capable of being made more so, are Axioms. 
Axioms from w^hich many inferences are to be 
derived, are Principles. All reasoning is carried 
on by the means of words, or other arbitrary 
Signs. 

One thing affirmed or denied, concerning 
another, is a Proposition. The words express- 
ing these two things aud their connexion, are 
the Terms. Terms which may be exchanged, 
one for another, without destroying the truth 



14 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

of an affirmation, are Convertible. Terms 
which imply, one the other, are Correlative. 

A positive and unconditional proposition is 
Categorical. A proposition which offers for 
choice one affirmation of two, is a Dilemma. 
Propositions are either Affirmative, or Nega- 
tive ; Indefinite, Disjunctive, or Universal. 

The thing concerning whicii an affirmation 
or negation is made, is the Subject of a propo- 
sition. The thing affirmed is the Predicate. 

The connecting of propositions, for the pur- 
pose of exhibiting the relation which subsists 
between them, is a Syllogism ; in which the 
facts granted are called the premises ; the fact 
inferred — the Conclusion ; or the three con- 
nected propositions, are called the Major, 
Minor, and Middle terms. 



VOCABULARY, &c. 



ABSTRACTION. 



From Ahstraho, to draw ofjf, or to draw apart ; 
or to separate and take away one thing from 
among a number. 

Things that differ very greatly, one from 
another, are often found to be aUke in some 
single quality ; and when this one quality is 
distinctly taken notice of, we readily learn to 
think of it apart from the other quahties with 
which it may have been joined ; and tiius the 
mind acquires the habit of drawing o^ certain 
properties of things, and of giving names to 
them : this habit is called abstraction ; and the 
words employed on such occasions are called 
abstract terms. 

There are, for instance, placed before us, a 
cricket-ball, a marble, a glass bubble, an apple, 
and an orange ; and we are asked if these things 
are ahke ; we answer, No : for the first is brown, 
and may be indented ; the second is heavy, and 



16 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

impenetrable ; the third is transparent, and 
fragile, and light ; the fourth is green and pulpy ; 
the fifth is yellow and fragrant. But is there 
then no respect wherein they are alike ? Yes ; 
they are alike in shape, or form — they are 
round. Roundness then is the quality or cir- 
cumstance in which these five objects agree, and 
which may be thought of, and spoken of, apart 
from the iveight, hardness^ color, or smell, of 
these five things. Thus we have obtained two 
abstract ideas — namely, that of form or figure, 
and that of roundness ; roundness being a par- 
ticular sort of form. Examples of this kind are 
easily multiplied ; we will take another. Water, 
and glass, and spirits, and diamonds, admit the 
rays of light to pass through them; so that 
objects may be discerned almost as clearly when 
they iatervene, as w^hen they are removed. 
Some other bodies possess the same quality in 
a less degree ; such as amber, and the ame- 
thyst, and the ruby, &c. We want a name for 
this property, belonging as it does to things so 
different as water, glass, and stones; and we 
call it Transparency. 

Each of the five senses has its class of ab- 
stractions ; that is to say, each sense separates 
single qualities from other qualities, discerned 
by itself, or by other senses. The eye separates 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 17 

redness from yellowness, or whiteness, &c., 
and brightness from duhiess ; — and again sepa- 
rates colom* from figure, and it separates 
colour and figure from the notions obtained 
bj the other senses, such as hardness, or 
weight, or fragrancj, or fluidity. The sense of 
taste not only distinguishes sour from sweet and 
bitter, but separates them from the qualities 
that are made known to the mind by the sense 
of touch, as heat and cold, asperity and 
softness, &c. 

Thus it is that likeness, or sameness of 
quality, in things otherwise unlike, leads the 
mind to form abstract notions, and to use ab- 
stract words. But having acquired this habit, 
it employs the power of separation in many 
other instances than those that belong to the 
five senses : — for example. If a man restores 
freely the property of another, which he could 
not have been compelled to relinquish ; or if he 
speaks the exact truth when it might have been 
advantageous to him to utter a falsehood ; or if 
in any way he regards the welfare of other men, 
when he is tempted to secure his own benefit, 
w-e form a notion which we separate from the 
particular circumstances that may have belonged 
to the man's conduct ; — we feel that there is a 
pecuHar quality, that belongs to his conduct, on 
all these several occasions, and we call it — In- 



18 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

tegritj ; and the so acting is-— -Justice. Justice 
is not the name of one action, or of one kind 
of action ; but of the abstract notion which 
belongs to any action wherein a man pays strict 
regard to the rights and property of others. Or, 
if, in his actions, he goes beyond what might 
have been demanded of him ; — -if he prefers the 
w^elfare of his neighbour to his own ; then we 
form the notion of another sort of quahty, and 
call it — Generosity, or kindness. And in any 
new instance, even if all the circumstances 
are diiferent, yet if a friend or stranger confers 
upon us a benefit which he might properly have 
withheld, we are reminded of the notion we had 
before formed, and call the action or the person 
generous. 

Some abstract notions are simple ; that is to 
say, they cannot be described or made known 
otherwise than by single words, or by pointing 
to the objects in which they are to be seen or 
felt. Such are, redness^ whiteness, heat, cold, 
siveetness, pleasure, pain, and many others. If 
the person to whom we would convey our mean- 
ing has never himself perceived the quality we 
are speaking of, we cannot impart to him our 
idea by words : or if he does not understand 
the word we first use, we must find some other, 
of the same meaning; — if he does not know 
what the word pain means, w^e must try the word 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 19 

dolor, or some other; but if lie have never felt 
pain, the most ingenious description of it would 
be utterly useless. 

But there are abstract notions that are Com- 
plex, or made up of two or more ideas ; and 
may therefore be described by mentioning those 
constituent ideas. Thus in the instances al- 
ready mentioned. Justice may be described as 
the paying a strict regard to the rights and in- 
terests of others ; or the not preferring our own 
welfare to that of others. Generosity is the 
conferring of benefits upon others beyond what 
they could claim. Form or figure is the rela- 
tion to each other of the several surfaces of a 
solid body. Distance is extension between two 
points, divided into parts, and numbered. Place 
is the relation between one point and some other 
points on a smface. Perfection is the existence, 
together, of all the parts or properties that 
are assigned to some complex body or being. 
Design is the relation of all the parts of a com- 
plex body to the last effect which it is intended 
to produce. Truth is the relation of sameness 
between things and our notions of them ; or be- 
tw^een notions and thoughts, and our affirmations. 
Liberty is the absence of restraint upon choice 
or action. Necessity is the certain connexion 
between cause and effect. In all such instances 



20 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

there is a notion conveyed by the word we em- 
ploy which admits of being resolved into two 
or more ideas. 

Now it is peculiarly important to understand 
the difference between simple and complex ab- 
stract notions, because, on the one hand, much 
time is often wasted in the vain attempt to de- 
scribe or analyse what is simple ; and on the 
other hand, much confusion often arises from 
neglecting to analyse notions that complex : 
hence it is that so many words are used in 
argument to which the disputants attach differ- 
ent ideas, and therefore are never able to come 
to an agreement even when they are really of 
the same opinion. It is a good exercise to de- 
fine or analyse complex abstract notions. 

The faculty of abstraction, conjoined with 
the use of language, is that chiefly which dis- 
tinguishes human nature, and raises man far 
above all other animals. 

After having thought of certain qualities apart 
from the things in which they are found, the 
human mind takes another step, and proceeds 
to bring together such qualities, and to compose 
them in new forms ; — this is Invention. 
The same faculty enables man to think of the 
quality, or goodness, or badness of actions, and 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 21 

is therefore essential to accountableness, and 
forms the basis of our moral nature. 

Those differences of intellectual character 
and taste which distinguish mankind individu- 
ally, depend very much upon the faculty of 
abstraction. One man possesses eminently the 
power of separating color from form, and he 
becomes a painter : another, in connexion with 
sensibihty and delicacy of tastes, readily sepa- 
rates or draivs off those qualities of things which 
excite the imagination, and he becomes a poet : 
another discerns and separates the mechanical 
properties of matter, and he is an inventor of 
machines : another discriminates mathematical 
properties, and he addicts himself to abstract 
science. Each department of science, and 
each walk of active life, has its pecuUar kind 
of abstraction ; nor can a man be very success- 
ful in any line, if nature has denied him the 
special faculty which is demanded in that line. 

What is called a natural taste for particular 
pursuits is most commonly a peculiar power of 
considering some one class of qualities, apart 
from all other qualities or circumstances. It is 
well when the choice of a profession is made 
in conformity with the original conformation 
of the mind. 



22 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

ABSTRUSE. 

From abstrudo, to hide, or thrust out of sight. 
This is a word of indefinite meaning, for it 
may be applied to whatever is not readily un- 
derstood or explained ; and that which to one 
mind is very obscure or difficult, is to another 
perfectly intelhgible. It is a frequent inaccu- 
racy to confound the words abstruse and abstroM; 
or to use them as if synonymous. It is very true 
that abstract notions or principles are often ab- 
struse ; or, at least, may seem so to those who 
are not conversant with subjects of that sort. 

ACCIDENT. 

From accido, to fall close by, or to happen. 
When used in its philosophical sense, the term 
accident is applied to some quality, or property, 
or condition, which does not invariably belong 
to the thing in which it is found, or which 
makes no part of its essence ; as heat in iron, 
polish to a diamond, learning to a man. 

ACTIVE and PASSIVE. 

Whatever produces a change in another body 
is active : the body which undergoes the change 
is passive. The same being may at one time 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 23 

be active, at another passive ; or at one and the 
same moment may be in part active, in part 
passive. Thus the human mind is often at 
once active and passive. It is passive when it 
admits, and is influenced by impressions from 
the senses ; or when moved by the appetites 
and passions that belong to the animal or moral 
constitution ; or when it is influenced through 
the medium of language, by other minds ; and 
also when it merely follows the current of 
thought, and is in that state in which it maybe 
likened to a person sitting at a window, who 
idly gazes at the crowd that passes before him. 
This is the state of the mind in sleep ; and also 
in what is called reverie. It is only in an im- 
proper sense that we can be said to think, when 
thus indolently musing. The mind acts, either 
when it exerts its power over matter — that is, 
over the muscles of the body ; or over itself, by 
directing, changing, or fixing at pleasure, the 
course of its thoughts. The possession of this 
active power is essential to what is termed 
moral agency, or accountableness ; without it, 
the mind, like the minds of animals, is swayed 
and governed by external and internal influences. 
The same power shows itself in all those acts 
of life by which man raises his condition above 



24 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

til at of the brutes. Energy and dignity of 
character bear proportion to the degree in which 
the mind is more active than passive. 

If the human mind were merely ruled, from 
one moment to another, by its appetites and 
passions, it would never imagine a better con- 
dition than the one it is in, nor fix its attention 
upon the means proper to attain an end. What 
is called attention, is the exercise of the active 
principle of the mind. It is usual to speak of 
physical causes as active ; but when any series 
of natural changes is scrutinized, it appears that 
what at first we called a cause, is itself the 
effect of some preceding event, which was, in 
its turn, also an effect. We come, at length, to 
what are called the hidden powers of nature, 
such as gravitation — chemical affinity — the prin- 
ciple of life, and so forth ; and these, though 
beyond human knowledge, are, probably, them- 
selves only effects of some relation between one 
element and another. Strictly speaking, Mind 
is the only active principle. The movements 
of nature are the effects of the Divine Mind. 
The changes that take place in the world of 
living and conscious beings, are the effects of 
the living power which the Creator has im- 
parted to man and animals. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 25 

ADJUNCT, 

From adjunctwn, joined to. The words ad- 
junct and accident are thus distinguished ; — an 
accident is a quality or condition that may or 
may not belong to the thing spoken of : an ad- 
junct is a thing which may or may not be at- 
tached to something else. The binding is an 
adjunct of a book : the brightness of the paper^ 
and blackness of the ink, are its accidents. 
Praise is an adjunct of virtue ; celebrity, of 
genius. Mental refinement, or taste, is an ac- 
cident of virtue ; self-confidence, of genius. 

AFFECTION. 

From affectus, changed or qualified by the 
operation of some cause. The properties of 
any body are called its affections, in distinction 
from the matter or substance of the body, which 
we are prone to think of as a something to 
which its properties are attached. In truth, we 
are acquainted with nothing but those qualities 
or affections, which make themselves known to 
us through the senses ; and all the usual quali- 
ties, taken together, are, so far as our know- 
ledge extends — all the thing. The distinction, 
therefore, between substance and affection, is 
not real or important. This, and many such 



26 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

terms, though still occasionally employed, belong 
to the obsolete metaphysics and logic which 
were in fashion two centmies ago. 

AFFIRMATIVE and NEGATIVE, 

Are terms belonging to the art of reasoning 
and of disputation. All discourse may be re- 
solved into a series of propositions, each of 
which declares or asserts that something is or is 
not ; may be, or may not be ; that one thing is 
equal, or like to, unequal, or unlike to, some 
other thing. Every verb with its nominative ; 
or, if it be transitive, with its nominative and 
objective cases, is an affirmative proposition ; 
or becomes a negative one by the addition of a 
negative particle. The altered termination 
wdiich fixes the tense of the verb is a concise 
way of attaching to the affirmation another 
affirmation, wdiich conveys the time of the 
alleged fact. Again, the mood is a third affir- 
mation, succinctly attached to the principal one, 
and which declares the circumstances of possi- 
bility, or doubt, or desire, which belong to it. 
An adverb is another condensed proposition, 
attached to the first. For example, — " Alex- 
ander might long have ruled the world." This 
affirmation contains four distinct assertions, as, 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 27 

1st, an implied negative ; — Alexander did not 
long govern the world. 2d, An affirmative im- 
plied ; — Alexander had the power of long go- 
verning the world ; — i. e. if he had restrained 
his appetites and passions. 3d, An affirmation 
of the time ; — he might have done so : viz. in 
that distant age in which he hved. 4th, An 
affirmative conclusion ; — If Alexander had not 
destroyed himself, it is probable that his con- 
quests would have remained in his possession 
to the end of the longest term of human hfe. 

We do not often stop to recollect how much 
meaning is condensed within five or six words 
by the aid of grammatical forms. If it were 
not that these methods of compression enable 
language to keep pace with the rapidity of 
thought, it would be almost useless as a medium 
of intercourse ; for the mind could not confine 
itself to a movement so very much slower than 
that which is natural to itself Let any one 
attempt to listen continuously to a narrative, 
every word of which should be spelt by the 
speaker ; he would find it utterly impossible to 
do so. 

AGENT. 

"Whatever is supposed to be endowed with 
power is called an agent. When the word is 



28 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

applied to physical causes — as we speak some- 
times of chemical or mechanical agents, it is 
understood to be used in a tropical or improper 
sense. Strictly speaking, Minds are the only 
agents. See Active, Power, and Cause. 



AGGREGATE, 

From dggrego, to gather together as a flock 
of sheep. Things which, when collected or 
brought into contact, form a whole in the mind 
only, and are not susceptible of any actual com- 
bination, may be said to form an aggregate. The 
word is used with the strictest propriety when 
the things or qualities so associated make up 
some complete abstract notion. 

The aggregate of qualities, acquirements, 
natural advantages, and external recommenda- 
tions, which are necessary to form an accom- 
plished statesman, or a successful advocate, 
comprise many special endowments, or faculties, 
which would not be called for to complete the 
character of an accomplished gentleman. We 
form an abstract notion of what a statesman or 
lawyer ought to be ; and the pecuhar qualities 
which we think of as necessary, make up the 
aggregate of his endowments. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 29 

AGREEMENT, 

Is something less than absolute sameness. 
Identity excludes every difference, even of sub- 
stance or person. Sameness implies the pre- 
sence of two or more things, which being com- 
pared, are found to have no other difference 
than that of substantial or personal identity. 
Agreement may subsist between things that are 
alike only in one quahty, or in one point of rela- 
tionship. John yesterday, and John to-day, is 
identically one and the same person. Two circles 
struck with the same radius, are the same in all 
respects, except absolute identity. Between a 
chest of tea and a bale of raw silk, there may 
be an agreement of exchangeable value ; that 
is to say, the one may be purchasable by the 
same number of pieces of money as the other. 

ANALOGY ; 

From ctvaXo^jft, conformity of reason, or causa- 
tion. Analogy is a real or true agreement, or 
similarity of causes. A similarity in appear- 
ances, or in effects, or in incidental circumstances, 
is the foundation of metaphor, allegory, emblem, 
and rhetorical figure. Analogy addresses itself 
to the reasoning faculty. Allegory and meta- 
phor address the imagination. Analogy, care- 



30 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

fully pursued, may afford a solid foundation of 
argument. Metaphors prove nothing, and are 
useful only in the way of illustration, or embel- 
lishment. Whenever we anticipate or predict 
certain effects to take place, on the supposition 
that certain causes, with which in some other 
case we have become acquainted, are in opera- 
tion, we reason from analogy. After it had 
been observed that rice flourishes in the hot and 
humid plains of Egypt, it was by reasoning 
from analogy that it was inferred that it might 
advantageously be cultivated in the sultry 
swamps of Carolina. The heat of the climate 
and the abundance of water, are presumed to 
be the causes of the productiveness of rice ; 
and it is inferred that an ardent sun and a 
marshy soil will, in any country, favor the 
growth of the same species of grain. We rea- 
son from analogy when we suppose that the 
stars, like the sun, are surrounded with planets, 
which derive from them light and heat. The 
same Divine Wisdom which is seen to have 
made this admirable arrangement in one in- 
stance, is presumed to have made it also in others. 
When we see that every part of the earth's 
surface, and every drop of water, is crowded 
with animated beings, we reason from analogy 
in supposing that the Divine Benevolence, 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 31 

which has filled one spot of his universe with 
life, has done the same in other places of his do- 
minion. The strength of such an argument 
from analogy consists in an implied series of 
propositions of this sort : The Divine Wisdom 
and Goodness display themselves around us in 
the production of innumerable orders of sentient 
beings. These attributes of the Divine nature 
are unchanging and universal. They are pre- 
sent in one system as well as in another. It is 
therefore certain that they produce alike in all 
systems their proper effects, unless some special 
reason interposes to confine them. An argu- 
ment from analogy is strong ; but not absolutely 
conclusive, or demonstrative ; because, as we 
carry our reasoning from a circle that is known 
to us, to one that is unknown, we can never be 
assured that there may not be, within that un- 
known sphere, some antagonist cause at work, 
of which, in our own sphere, we see no traces. 
Nevertheless, an argument from analogy falls 
very little short of demonstrative force, when 
we reason upward from effects to causes ; or 
infer that causes must be the same^ when the 
effects are so. As if it were found that rice 
flourishes wherever the climate is hot, and the 
soil humid, we might, with confidence, infer 



32 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

that heat and humidity are in some manner the 
causes of the productiveness of that grain. 

It is an argument of this latter kind which 
has been so successfully pursued by Bishop 
Butler, in his Analogy of Natnral and Revealed 
Religion, wherein he shows that the same great 
principles which take effect in the world, as we 
see it to be constituted, prevail also in the sys- 
tem of Christianity; whence it may be inferred 
that both proceed from the same Author. Or at 
least Christianity can never be reasonably re- 
jected on pretence that it is irreconcileable 
with the actual constitution of the moral sys- 
tem, for a strict analogy subsists between the 
two. 

Errors in argument very frequently arise from 
confounding resemblances or metaphors, with 
analogies. Minds imperfectly cultivated, are 
peculiarly open to this sort of mistake. The 
beauty or appropriateness of some comparison, 
captivates the imagination, and imposes on the 
understanding ; and so truth is lost sight of 
amid the illusions of poetry. Thus, for exam- 
ple, it may be said that the mind of man is like 
a garden, which, if neglected, will become 
choked with rank and noxious vegetation ; but 
which, when sedulously cultivated, produces 
whatever is beautiful, fragrant, dehcious, and 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 33 

useful. So far the resemblance holds good ; 
and the metaphor well serves the purpose of 
illustration. But if a real analogy between the 
vegetable w^orld and the intellectual and moral 
system were presumed to exist, many utterly 
erroneous consequences might be drawn from 
it : — as for instance, it might then be said that, 
though the feeble tribes of the garden may need 
culture, the robust and magnificent species of 
the forest spurn the hand of art, and tower the 
highest where they are the least interfered with : 
— and so that the noblest natures can receive 
no advantage from culture ! This were to argue 
on the absurd supposition that the internal struc- 
ture of oaks, and of human minds is the same. 

ANALYSIS, 

From ccvaXuw, to unloose or dissolve. Abstrac- 
tion is the separation of some single quality or 
property from all others, without giving any 
attention to those other qualities. Analysis is 
the separation of some compound body into its 
several component parts, while we give equal 
attention to all those parts or elements. Abstrac- 
tion carries the mind from object, to object, 
wherever a certain quality can be detected. 
Analysis fixes the mind upon a single object. 



34 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

until all its parts have been brought to light. 
In cheoiistry, analysis is the separation of all 
the elements that may be combined in any sub- 
stance. Thus, atmospheric air, when analysed, 
is found to consist of two gases, and often to 
contain some portion of others. Water is the 
union of oxygen and hydrogen. Chemical 
phrases express, in a concise manner, those com- 
binations that have been discovered by analysis. 
The notions or feehngs of the mind admit also 
of being analysed ; and to do so with absolute 
precision, requires a pecuhar excellence of the 
intellectual faculties; an excellence which is the 
principal ingredient in the philosophic character. 
The power of abstraction, and the power of 
analysis, when both possessed in an eminent 
degree, fit the mind to pursue the higher and 
more abstruse branches of science. 

An analysis of the notions, sensations, or 
states of the mind, demands close attention, and 
some practise also, to effect it with absolute pre- 
cision. An easy example or two of this sort of 
analysis may thus be given. — We suppose there 
to be now present to the mind the idea of a 
country mansion, with its garden, and lawn, 
and shrubbery. This idea, or image, or mental 
picture, as we might call it, though made up of 
various parts, is yet all of one kind : it is a 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 35 

mental perception of objects which have actually 
passed through the organ of vision. But w^e 
now suppose there to be joined to this image a 
feeling or conviction, that the image is not com- 
pounded by the fancy; but that it corresponds 
to a real object, and that we have seen that 
object, at a certain past time : the image is con- 
nected in the mind with a train of events — a 
journey, or a visit. This conviction is expressed 
by the word memory ; and we say that we 
recollect, or remember, having see such a fesi^ 
dence. But beside the image, and the recollec- 
tion of it, there is perhaps, in the mind, some 
vivid emotion of pleasure or regret, arising from 
circumstances that occurred at the time: we 
there parted with a dear friend, or there enjoyed 
the society of some distinguished persons. Now 
these emotions of pleasure or regret, and this 
conviction of past time, are so intimately con- 
nected with the image of the mansion, that we 
find it impracticable to recal or dwell upon the 
idea without bringing up also the memory and 
the emotion. And unless an effort of the mind 
is made — an effort of analysis, we feel as if there 
were but one undivided and indivisible idea or 
remembrance present to us. Or to take an 
instance of another sort. — The notion excited 
in the mind by the words Prodigality and Par- 



36 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

simony, may at first seem to be simple and un- 
compounded ; but not so when we ask ourselves 
what precisely we mean by the terms. Is the 
mere spending of a large income prodigality? 
or is the spending of a small one parsimony? 
no ; something more belongs to the idea. To 
spend a large income well and liberally, is not 
to be prodigal, but munificent. The spending 
a small one with care and self-denial, is frugality. 
To be prodigal is to spend much wastefully, or 
without reason, or utility. To be parsimonious 
is to spend less than reason and charity demand ; 
it is to refrain from those expenses which a 
man's income would fully cover, and so to re- 
frain, for the sake of accumulating money. 

This sort of analysis of complex notions is 
indispensable to accuracy of thought, and to pro- 
priety in the use of language. 

What is a straight line? What is a circle ? 
Our idea of them seems simple, and at first we 
may doubt whether they are capable of being 
analysed; but we shall find that both may be 
described, and therefore must be complex : for 
to describe a thing is to mention its component 
parts or elements. A line is a continued series 
of points ; a straight line is that series which 
makes the shortest distance between its two 
extremes. A circle is a succession of points, all 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 37 

equally distant from one and the same point, 
called its centre. The analysis of complex 
notions leads naturally to a discovery of the 
properties and relative value of the things 
analysed. 

Those vv^ho do not possess, or who have not 
cultivated and exercised the faculties of abstrac- 
tion and analysis, when required to explain 
what they mean by some word which expresses 
a complex abstract notion, such, for example, as 
Liberty, seek for a synonymous word, and 
reply, Liberty is freedom ; or they find a particu- 
lar instance, and say " a man who is not in prison 
has liberty." But this sort of answer, though 
sufficient on ordinary occasions, can serve no 
purpose when exactness of thought is required, 
as in cases of argument. It is a fault of an 
opposite kind to busy one's self in the vain 
attempt to analyse ^m^/e abstract notions, such, 
for example, as those expressed by the words 
space, existence, pain, 'pleasure, &c. Persons who 
have more activity and subtilty than strength or 
clearness of understanding, are prone to this 
error ; they delight in whatever is abstruse , 
confound the obscure with the abstract; are 
reluctant to assent to simple and perspicuous 
propositions; and while perpetually in search 
of what may seem new and profound, become 



restless and variable in their opinions: and 
employ themselves with infinite labour upon 
endless and unintelligible questions. They in- 
vent or introduce new names for common ideas- 
and often believe themselves to have made great 
discoveries in abstruse philosophv, which how- 
ever none can comprehend ; or they laboriously 
afihrm and demonstrate what no one denies; or 
what has no meaning. 



APPETITE 



From appeto, to desire. AH those desires 
which arise from bodily organs, and which are 
necessary to the preservation of the animal sys- 
tem, are called appetites ; and are usually dis- 
tinquished from those which belong more to the 
mind, and which are called passions or emotions 
In his appetites man is not greatly distinguished 
from the inferior orders, but essentially so in his 
passions; for although the dog, the horse, the 
iion, the elephant, are susceptible of anger pride 
ambition, as well as of affection ; these emotions' 
arehttle more than transitory impulses; but the 
passions and affections of the human heart take 
permanent possession of the mind, and rule the 
character and conduct. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 39 

APPREHENSION ; 

From apprehendo, to take hold of. This 
word is used when the mind fully admits the 
ideas intended to be conveyed by a proposition ; 
or when the terms of an argument, and their 
relation one to another are recognized as being 
familiar and unquestionable. Apprehension is 
distinguished from the next act of the miiid, 
which is to form a judgment of the truth or false- 
ness of some proposition founded upon, or 
derived from what is known. If it were affirmed 
that sparrows build nests of clay under the 
eaves of houses, we should indeed at once appre- 
hend the assertion ; all its terms are intelligible, 
and relate to matters familiarly known ; but we 
immediately deny it to be true; the affirmation 
is perspicuous, but false. It is otherwise if an 
uninformed person is told that the class inain- 
malia suckles its young ; for in this case he can 
neither assent to the proposition nor deny it : 
he does not apprehend it — the terms being un- 
known to him. Many judgments are formed 
on the assumption that we apprehend, or are 
familiar with the terms, when in fact this is not 
the case. Phrases may be familiar to the ear, 
which are not so to the 7nind, 



40 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

ARGUMENT, 

Is the artificial process by which some propo- 
sition that is open to, doubt, or which niaj be 
denied, is shewn, or probably shewn to be true, 
or worthy of belief, in a higher or a lower degree. 
A proposition that may be established beyond 
the possibility of doubt is said to be demons- 
trably certain. But this sort of infallible reason- 
ing belongs to very few except mathematical 
truths, and matters of testimony, when the evi- 
dence is of the most satisfactory kind. A sound 
argument consists of a number of propositions, 
each one of which is separately true, and true 
also in its relation to the one which precedes, 
and the one which follows it. It is necessary 
also to a sound argument, that its several propo- 
sitions should stand in a just order. It is more- 
over implied, in a complete and satisfactory 
argument, that the person to whom it is addressed 
already admits, or assents to, each of the sepa- 
rate propositions ; and that he will grant the 
truth of the connexion affirmed to exist between 
them when clearly exhibited. If he denies, 
either some one of the propositions, or some one 
of the connexions, then means must be used for 
ascertaining the truth in that particular instance, 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 41 

before any further progress can be made in the 
controversy. We take an example of the most 
famihar sort, and one that will exhibit the 
difference between demonstation and argument. 
B. affirms that in going from London to Nor- 
wich, it is better to pass through Dunmow, 
Clare, and Bury, than to take the road through 
Chelmsford, Colchester, and Ipswich. C. denies 
this assertion. B. then says he cdiW demonstrate 
the truth of his proposition ; and forthwith pro- 
ceeds to compute the distances from place to 
place ; that is, he affirms, in due succession, a 
number oi admitted truths ; such as that Rom- 
ford is twelve miles from London, Brentwood 
six miles from Romford, and so on throughout 
the route ; and he connects and computes these 
several distances on admitted principles, and 
truly sums up the entire series. So far this is 
a demonstration, and is unanswerable when com- 
pared with a similar computation of the other 
route. But C. replies, ' You have indeed de- 
monstrated that the road through Dunmow is 
shorter than that through Chelmsford ; but yet 
have not convinced me that one had better go 
that way than the other; on the contrary, I 
can bring an argument to prove that the longer 
road is actually preferable to the shorter; and 
that in fact time will be gained by going eight 



42 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

or ten miles about.' For this purpose he affirms 
a number of facts, none of which perhaps his 
opponent will deny; but which are of too in- 
definite a kind to form part of a niethematical 
demonstration, although very proper to be con- 
sidered in the general argument. These in- 
definite facts are such as — ^the narrowness and 
raggedness of the roads — the probable delay 
arising from the want of horses, and so forth. 
Now these assertions, though founded in truth ; 
may have been misstated or exaggerated; and 
hence it may become necessary to examine 
each separate proposition, of which the general 
argument consists ; and the disputants must 
agree upon all the particulars, before they can 
agree upon the conclusion. — That is to say, the 
necessary conditions of every sound argument 
must be complied with on both sides; each 
proposition must be assented to, and its con- 
nexion with the one which precedes, and the 
one which follows, must also be admitted by 
both disputants. 

It is evident then that an argument is strictly 
conclusive only when all the facts contained in 
it are truly known by the disputants, and are 
understood also in their relation one to another. 
An argument is of no avail for discovering 
things unknown ; but can serve only to set forth 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 43 

the connexion of a certain fact with another, 
which, hitherto, we have not perceived to be 
related to it. 

A very large proportion of all controversies are 
fruitless and inconclusive, simply because the 
disputants, on both sides, in their eagerness to 
carry their opinion, or to confound their oppo- 
nent, assume many things to be knowm and un- 
questionable, which are not so ; or because they 
neglect to ascertain the sense in which they them- 
selves use the terms they employ ; at the same time 
they refuse to give due attention to the explana- 
tions of their opponent's meaning. Thus argu- 
ment is converted into wrangling ; and often ter- 
minates in a personal contest. Thus it is, too, 
that diiferences of opinion are perpetuated, and 
that men learn to love truth only when it favours 
the faction to which they attach themselves, and 
to hate and fear it when it favours an adversary. 
Beside that accuracy and strength of under- 
standing which is the first requisite in the dis- 
covery of truth, it is not less necessary to possess 
a conscientious preference of truth to interest, 
favour, or prejudice, and especially so when re- 
ligious principles are in question. In this in- 
stance there is need that the mind should be 
freed from those evil inclinations and those uni- 



44 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

versal corrupt prejudices which belong, in 
greater or less degrees to every human mind, 
and which render every mind inimical to the 
great principles of Christianity. 

ARRANGEMENT, 

Differs from Classification, which is a sorting 
of things according to their real differences ; 
whereas this is a sorting them for some parti- 
cular purpose, in the manner that may be pre- 
scribed by special reasons of convenience. 
The books of a library may be classified ac- 
cording to the subjects of which they treat ; or 
they may be arranged in that order which will 
bring those most often wanted within reach. 
It is often of more practical importance to ar- 
range our thoughts in an artificial manner, such 
as shall give the mind a ready command over 
its stores, than to think precisely in the mode 
that is rigidly philosophical. 

Skill and address in the arrangement of our 
thoughts is peculiarly advantageous to those 
whose business it is to teach or to persuade 
others ; while habits of analysis, classification, 
and abstraction, are proper and indispensable to 
those who addict themselves to the discovery 
of truth. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 45 

ART, 

Is distinguished from science, rather bj an ac- 
cidental, than a real difference. Art is the know- 
ledge of general facts, and science is so too. But 
it is only that part of such knowledge which is 
inunediatelj convertible to practical purposes 
that is called art ; while that which is either 
not at all applicable to common purposes, or 
only so in a remote manner, is called science. 
A knowledge of the chemical laws of fermen- 
tation is apphcable to the preparation of an 
ordinary beverage, and when so applied is called 
the art of brewing. If no such fermented 
liquor were in use, then the knowledge of the 
same facts would stand undistinguished, as part 
of the science of chemistry. 

The art of navigation (in a principal branch 
of it) is an application of the knowledge of the 
places and movements of the heavenly bodies, 
to the purpose of ascertaining a ship's latitude 
and longitude. If men never adventured them- 
selves upon the wide bosom of the sea, they 
might still know the same facts ; but would call 
their knowledge science. In the natural order 
of discovery, art, in a rude form, precedes 
science ; and then science instructs art ; and 
again, these amended arts give man so much 
command over the operations of nature, that 



46 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

wealth is accumulated ; and many individuals, 
in every community, are, by that means, set free 
from the necessity of labouring for subsistence, 
of whom some addict themselves to the culti- 
vation of philosophy, from the influence of mere 
taste. In this manner new discoveries are 
made ; and these, more or less directly, improve 
the arts of life ; and so a perpetual advance- 
ment goes on by the mutual influence of me- 
chanical skill and philosophical principles. 

ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS. 

It is the law or usage of the human mind 
long to retain any connexion, even of the most 
accidental kind, which has once been formed 
between two or more thoughts or states of feel- 
ing. If one of these linked or associated ideas 
is brought back to the mind, the other, most 
often, returns with it. No one can need in- 
stances of this sort to be mentioned, for every 
moment presents them to every mind. It is 
however important to distinguish what may be 
called the natural^ or spontaneous association 
of ideas, from that which is the consequence of 
certain habits of the mind. The law of spon- 
taneous association shows itself most com- 
pletely in dreaming, when ideas of all kinds 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 47 

follow one the other, in a disorderly and fantas- 
tic manner ; and yet so that we can (when 
dreams are recollected with sufficient distinct- 
ness) often perceive the link or tie which made 
one image succeed to another. In musing or 
reverie the same law of accidental connexion 
makes itself apparent in the succession of ideas 
and emotions. The prattle of children, and 
the idle chat of uncultivated or frivolous per- 
sons, very commonly presents the same sort of 
fortuitous succession of ideas, connected only 
by incidental and unimportant circumstances 
of similarity, or of juxta-position, in time or 
place. The strength and culture of the mind 
may be fairly estimated by the degree in which 
it ordinarily yields itself to this current of spon- 
taneous or accidental associations. 

When certain habits of mind have been 
formed and settled by exercise and application, 
they displace and supersede, to a great extent, 
the law of accidental association. A mind 
naturally vigorous, and which has acquired 
much control over its movements, and has ad- 
dicted itself to particular employments, no 
longer follows the fortuitous course of ideas ; 
but pursues, in some one chosen path, the real 
or rational connexion of ideas one with another. 
That is to say, the idea which follows the one 



48 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

last present to the mind, will be that which in 
fact and nature, is the most nearly related to its 
predecessor. Thus, if the whole series of ideas 
were expressed or uttered, those who hstened 
to it would not liave to search for the link 
which connected one thought with another, but 
would perceive it in the very nature of the 
subject. 

The mathematician, the mechanician, the 
statesman, the poet, the artist, the man of busi- 
ness, each acquires his proper habit of associa- 
tion, and each is prompt and successful in his 
line, just in proportion to the rationality and 
the closeness of the connexions that have been 
formed in his mind. This principle of the as- 
sociation of ideas is sometimes, or by some 
writers, called the law of Suggestion. The 
meaning of the two phrases is much the same. 

ATTENTION. 

Not even the most frivolous, childish, or 
feeble mind, is always, or entirely, governed by 
the fortuitous association of ideas (spoken of in 
the preceding article.) Nor how strong soever 
may be any particular habit of thinking, is any 
mind absolutely incapable of breaking off its 
customary meditations, and of fixing itself upon 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 49 

another set of ideas. Every one is conscious 
of possessing a power (more or less perfect) of 
detaining some one thought, or class of thoughts, 
ia the mind, and of considering, or viewing a 
particular subject successively, in all its parts 
and relations. This power is called Attention. 
It is the proper and distinguishing excellence of 
the human mind ; and, in connexion with the 
faculty of abstraction, forms the essential differ- 
ence between man and the brute, as well intel- 
lectually as morally. The degree in which it 
is possessed distinguishes also one human mind 
from another. 

The exertion of this power of attention sup- 
poses some motive or desire to be present, or 
some inducement to be within view, which at- 
tracts the mind in one direction rather than 
another. It is a great excellence in the mental 
conformation, when a tranquil motive will en- 
sure a high degree of attention ; and moreover, 
when attention can be readily and fully trans- 
ferred from one object to another ; and it is a 
still higher excellence when attention can be 
given in an efficient degree, to several objects at 
the same time. 

A sluggish mind is one which can be roused 
to attention only by the most urgent or stimu- 
lating motives. A iveaJc mind is one that may 

3 



50 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

be quickly roused to attention, but which as 
quickly spends itself by the effort. An acute 
mind is one that is capable of a very vigorous, 
momentary effort. A 'profound mind is one ca- 
pable of long-continued attention, upon the 
same subject ; and which can sustain its atten- 
tion by motives of the most tranquil sort. A 
comprehensive and efficient mind is capable, both 
of long-continued efforts of attention, and of 
what may be called multifarious attention : that 
is to say, it does not lose itself in its regard to 
a single class of ideas, but sees all objects in 
their various connexions and dependencies. 
Yet whatever may be the natural power of the 
mind, in these respects, it is susceptible of vast 
increase and improvement, by a well conducted 
education. Indeed the difference between an 
educated and uneducated person (supposing 
their natural faculties to have been equal) is 
manifested in nothing so conspicuously as in 
the greater command over its powers of atten- 
tion which the former has acquired. 

ATTRIBUTE ; 

From attrihuo, to give to, or impute. A 
quality, or manner of feeling or acting, asserted 
to be essential to any being, is called an attri- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 51 

biite of that being. The word expresses or 
imphes the act of assigning such or such a pro- 
perty to a substance or person ; and is most 
often employed in theology, and when the di- 
vine perfections are spoken of. 

AXIOM ; 

From a|i'w.aa, a sentence or affirmation, worthy 
to be receiv^ed. By philosophical usage the 
term is applied only to propositions that are at 
once unquestionable, or self-evident and funda- 
ment al ; or important, on account of the conse- 
quences which flow from them. Mathematical 
axioms are such as — That the whole is greater 
than any of the parts ; or, that equal things, 
added to equal, make equal. Metaphysical 
axioms are such as this — That there can be 
nothing more in an effect, than was contained 
in its cause. It is an axiom in morals, that the 
will of God is the rule of right and wrong. 

BEING : 

The most comprehensive of all simple ab- 
stract terms. It expresses the notion which 
results from our own consciousness, thought of 
as a whole : — we feel that we are, or that we 
exist. God is emphatically called the Supreme 



52 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

Being ; both because He, and He alone, is 
self- existent ; and because He is the author or 
cause of all other existences. 



BELIEF, 

Is that state of mind which is produced by 
arguments that appear to be good, or sufficient. 
Behef rests upon evidence of the kind that is 
not absolutely demonstrative, or irresistible ; 
hence it is susceptible of various degrees of 
strength, proportioned either to the intrinsic 
force of the evidence, or to the power of the 
understanding to perceive its force. There is 
much difference in different minds in this re- 
spect. Some instantly and clearly discern the 
soundness of an argument, or the consistency 
of testimony, and retain ever after an unshaken 
conviction of the truth of the fact or principle 
as so established. Other minds can but con- 
fusedly catch the connexion of reasons or evi- 
dences, and almost immediately lose wdiatever 
rational conviction they may, for a moment, 
have acquired ; or if they adhere to their 
opinion, do so blindly, and often with many se- 
cret misgivings. Some, on the other hand, in- 
capable of comprehending evidence, or impa- 
tient of the effort necessary for the purpose, 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 53 

embrace opinions, just as they choose their 
friends, by favour and prejudice, and adhere to 
them with a passionate resolution, and defend 
them with vehemence and doirmatism. 

It is a general, though not universal principle, 
that the calmness or the violence with which 
matters of belief are entertained, bears propor- 
tion to the soundness or the unsoundness of the 
mental process by which conviction has been 
attained. Those who by patient attention to 
argument have convinced themselves of the 
truth of certain opinions, are, for the most part, 
ready to exercise patience and forbearance to- 
wards an opponent ; while he who is conscious 
of being unable to give a good reason for his 
belief, betakes himself either to flippancy and 
banter, or to contumely, when his opinion is 
impugned. 

It is important to remark that, in almost all 
the aflairs of hfe, even when the most momen- 
tous interests, or life itself, are at stake, we are 
ordinarily required to act upon the strength of 
rational belief, and must not wait for demon- 
stration, or certainty. Nay, on some of the 
most signal occasions, we proceed on the 
ground only of some probable opinion, which 
falls very far short of full persuasion. But it 
is found (if a large number of instances are 



54 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

taken into the accoimt)tobe more advantageous, 
and less really hazardous, to act, and to venture 
upon some degree of probabihty, than to adhere 
habitually to the impulse of a suspicious and 
timid caution It is on the whole safe?- to be 
bold and believing, than sceptical. In by far 
the larger number of instances, we are called to 
rely upon testimony, rather than to act upon 
our personal knowledge of facts ; and it is found 
that human testimony (if certain cases are ex- 
cepted where there is a pecuhar temptation to 
falsify) is a very sufficient ground of confidence. 
It is so especially when testimony is supported 
by incidental proofs (see Testimony). To 
withhold belief in such cases, evinces either 
an infirm judgment or a petulant and captious 
temper. 

It is by no means always the case that we 
have the power of understanding the whole of 
what we are required, by good evidence, to be- 
lieve. The contrary most often happens ; that 
is to say, a certain fact is fully established, and 
yet nothing more is known than the general 
fact, or than its exteimal significance. In the 
mathematical sciences there are not few propo- 
sitions which, though demonstrably certain, are 
at the same time apparently incredible or im- 
possible ; so that though they cannot but be 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 55 

assented to, they can never be followed home 
by the human mind. Nevertheless, such facts 
or principles are taken confidently as the foun- 
dation of other principles. There are other 
truths which, though not seemingly incredible, 
yet so surpass the powers of the human mind 
to grasp them, that, while they are necessarily 
admitted as certain, we can advance no further, 
or little further, than to bUnd assent. Of this 
sort is the notion of eternity — or of duration, 
without beginning, as well as without end : and 
of this kind, too, are other great principles of 
natural religion, and much that relates to the 
omniscience, the power, the providence, and the 
moral government of God. These are subjects 
concerning which certain comprehensive pro- 
positions may be affirmed, with the most per- 
fect confidence, even while the mind feels its 
utter inability to comprehend what it assents 
to, or to reconcile one such principle with 
another. 

Those hidden powers that are developed in 
the movements and changes of the material 
world, such as gravitation, chemical and mag- 
netic attraction, electricity, vegetable and animal 
life, and so forth, demand assent, while nothing 
concerning them can be understood, beyond the 
external facts which make themselves known to 



56 ELEMENTS OF T H O U G PI T . 

the senses. Nothing then can be more absurd, 
or unphilosophical, than the determination ex- 
pressed by some persons that they will believe 
nothing which they do not understand. To carry 
such a purpose into effect on all subjects, would 
be to reduce a man to universal ignorance and 
idiotcy. Rational belief stands midway be- 
tween credulity and scepticism ; both of which 
are faults, as well of the understanding as of 
the temper. Credulity is the error of sanguine, 
imaginative, and weak minds, which, in their 
eagerness to receive and hold whatever dazzles 
the fancy, or moves the sensibilities, or awakens 
pleasing emotions of wonder and admiration, 
believe whatever, of this sort, may be presented 
to them, without inquiring upon what evidence 
it rests, or perhaps rejecting contrary testimony. 
It may be noted as a frequent fact, that those 
who believe the most readily, and in opposition 
to reason, are the most slow to beheve, or hard 
to be convinced, where evidence is good and 
abundant. The cause of this is easily assigned. 
— Good evidence appeals to the understanding ; 
but the credulous have, by the long indulgence 
of their credulity, enfeebled their understand- 
ings, and have become actually incapable of per- 
ceiving the force of argument : at the same 
time, the fruitless effort which they may make 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 57 

in a single instance, to do so, chills and con- 
founds the mind, and dispels those lively feel- 
ings of confidence with which thej are wont 
to entertain other convictions. Thej can be- 
lieve only by impulse, not by reason. 

Scepticism, though apparently an opposite 
error, not seldom proves itself to be nearly allied 
to credulity: the reason is, that both spring 
from infirmity of the understanding, or what 
might, if we w^ere to use a figurative expression, 
be termed a paralysis of the reasoning faculty. 
By pride, or jealousy, or petulance, or coldness 
of temper, the habit of distrusting all evidence 
has been indulged, until it has grown so strong, 
that even the most conclusive reasons fail to 
take effect upon the mind : all things appear 
alike uncertain ; a dimness afiects the faculties. 
But as the human mind cannot exist without 
its convictions, of some sort, it often becomes, 
in this enfeebled state, the prey of some childish 
delusions. Many noted sceptics have been ab- 
surdly superstitious, or credulous, in certain par- 
ticulars. It may be affirmed that credulity is, 
on the whole, much less absurd, and less mis- 
chievous too, than scepticism ; because it is less 
at variance with the constitution and course of 
the system in which man is placed. Upon the 
great field of human life, belief is the general 



58 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

rule ; disbelief belongs only to the exceptions 
from that rule : he, therefore, who ahoays be- 
lieves, will be much less often in the wrong, 
than he who alwo^ys doubts. The credulous 
has the mass of ordinary facts on his side ; the 
sceptic has only the single instances. 

CATEGORY. 

KaT7]vopia, a class of things concerning which 
something is affirmed absolutely ; not hypothe- 
tically, or liable to a condition. This is a 
technical term of logic. In popular use, a cate- 
gorical assertion is a positive one, admitting 
neither of exception nor uncertainty. 

CAUSE and EFFECT. 

The human mind is not merely acted upon 
through the senses, by external objects, but it 
acts also upon matter : that is to say, upon the 
muscular system ; and by that means upon 
foreign bodies. It also acts upon its own 
thoughts, changing and ruling them at pleasure. 
In consequence of this constitution of our na- 
ture, we produce many changes in the things 
around us. The consciousness of being able 
to do so, generates the notion which is called 
Power ; and then whatever has, or is imagined 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 59 

to possess, a power to produce changes in other 
things, or in itself, is called a Cause ; and the 
change so produced, is called an Effect The 
words cause and effect are a pair of inseparable 
or correlative terms, indicating the presence or 
the supposed presence, of that faculty to pro- 
duce changes which we feel to belong to our 
own minds, and which we call power. In the 
exercise of this power of mind, we first imagine, 
and invent, and contrive, and then, by muscular 
actions, we put the material substances around 
us into new forms, corresponding to the con- 
ception we had formed ; and these new combi- 
nations of matter are found to answer the end 
we had in view. Now this ordinary process of 
our own minds furnishes us with a very simple 
and convincing argument, whence we infer the 
existence of an Almighty and Intelligent Being, 
who, in a far higher degree than ourselves, pos- 
sesses both reason and power ; the effects of 
which are displayed on every side, in the ad- 
mirable contrivances of the material world. 
We thus attain the idea of a First Cause ; and 
assign to it all that actually exists, as its effect 
Having acquired, from our consciousness, the 
notion of power, followed instantly by some 
proper effect, we fall into a natural, and almost 
involuntary custom, of imputing or imagining 



60 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

the existence of power, wherever we find some 
one event to precede immediately and invari- 
ably another, which is called its effect. We 
carry this supposition much farther than we are 
philosophically warranted in doing, and thus 
learn to speak of the powers of nature, of the 
power of chemical agents, &c., when, in truth, 
we know nothing but the fact, that a certain par- 
ticular event always follows another. The 
warmth and the showers of spring are followed 
by the bursting of buds, and the rise of plants 
from the earth ; — the rising of the sun is followed 
by the ascent of mists from the valleys ; — the 
friction of two hard bodies is followed by a 
sensible heat ; — and in these, and innumerable 
other instances, we unthinkingly impute potver 
to the antecedent event, calling it the cause ; 
and call the consequent event its effect. What 
may actually be the nature of the connexion 
between the one and the other is absolutely 
unknown : but it is only in an improper sense 
that any material substance can be called a cause. 
Whenever, even by a mere -coincidence, one 
event has been observed frequently to accom- 
pany another, there is a propensity in the mind 
to regard the first as the cause of the second. 

But we never suppose this wdthout, at the 
same time, imputing to the one some sort of in- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 61 

fluence over the other. Thus, when in the 
minds of the vulgar, certain trivial occurrences, 
such as the croaking of a raven, or rhe breaking 
of a goblet, or the spilling of salt, are supposed 
to be the precursors of calamity, there is also 
imagined to exist an invisible influence, which 
connects the one event with the other. 

The mere connexion or sequency (as it is 
called) of events, does not give rise to the idea 
of cause and effect, unless there be room 
(whether justly or not) to impute power to one 
of them. If, by the road-side, mile after mile, 
trees are seen to be growing in pairs, no one 
imagines that the first tree in each pair is the 
cause of the second. But when it is seen, on a 
large meadow, that wherever a heap of decayed 
vegetable matter has lain, the grass is much 
more rank than in other places, it is involuntarily 
believed that the heap was, in some manner, 
though unknown, the cause of that increased 
vegetation. It may, perhaps, hereafter be dis- 
covered, that there is nothing in the manure 
which can, with any propriety, be called powei' ; 
nevertheless it is certain that there is some 
relation between the chemical properties of the 
manure, and the growth of the plant ; just as 
there is a real relation between the act of put- 
ting a weight into a scale, and the rise of the 



62 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

opposite end of the beam. This relation, 
whether known or unknown, being real and 
constant, may, without inconvenience, be spoken 
of as if it were cause and effect It is only ne- 
cessary always to recollect that power, in the full 
and strict sense of the word, belongs exclusively 
to MIND ; and that what are called the potvers of 
nature are nothing more than secret relations, 
between one property or form of matter and 
another. 

CLASSIFICATION, 

Is the sorting of things that differ in some 
respects, and are alike in others : the greatest 
difference being the rule of separation, and the 
greatest likeness the rule of association. Classi- 
fications are alwavs founded on some real and 
intrinsic qualities of the things sorted ; whereas 
arrangements are founded upon accidental qua- 
Hties or circumstances. Arrangements are made 
for convenience and the accomplishment of a 
particular purpose. Classifications are formed 
for the permanent advantage of the mind, which 
can become conversant with a multitude of 
objects only when the}^ are distributed into sorts, 
corresponding with their real and intrinsic dis- 
tinctions. An analysis is made by observing 
differences only : a classification is accomplished 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 63 

bj looking, first at resemblances, and then at 
differences. An analysis serves to make us ac- 
quainted with things of which hitherto we have 
been ignorant. A classification is useful for 
presenting a simple and comprehensive view of 
things already known. 

The assortments that are made of the objects 
of natural history are properly called classifica- 
tions, and are affected by bringing together all 
the animals that agree in some one distinct and 
unalterable peculiarity, such as shall be liable to 
no uncertainty, or confusion, in particular in- 
stances. Thus, according to the system of 
Linnaeus, all animals that suckle their young are 
included in one class called Mammalia. All 
birds are included in another ; all that live in- 
differently in air and water, in a third ; all 
fishes in a fourth ; all insects in a fifth ; and 
worms in a sixth. But then, if all the animals 
of the first class, for example, are brought toge- 
ther, it is found that, though ahke in the im- 
portant circumstance of suckling their young, 
they are unlike in a thousand other particulars ; 
so that it becomes necessary to classify this class. 
For the purpose of doing so with precision, 
another particular and invariable circumstance is 
fixed upon, and which is liable to no uncertainty. 
Such is found to be the number and position of 



64 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 



the teeth ; and there are known to be seven 
constant forms of diversity in this particular; 
which therefore divide the class Mammalia into 
seven onhrs ^ain, each order comprises 

animals widely diffiring one from ciiiother, and 
needing, tliereiore, a new classification, for it 
brings together men, monkeys, rabbits, and bats. 
These are sorted into fonr genera, or kinds. 
Bnt each genu^ has also different kinds ; as, for 
example, the monkey tribe, of which there are 
almost innumerable varieties : these varieties of 
a genus are called species. Thus, it appears, 
classification mnst be carried on so long as any 
number of beings are observed to agree in one 
or more particulars (if those particulars are de- 
finite and constant) and yet to disagree in 
others. 

COMMON TERMS, 

Or names, are words which, in consequence 
of some sort of classification, are applied to 
many individuals that are alike in some re- 
spects ; or in all but identity. Thus the word 
animal is a term common to all sentient, loco- 
motive, voluntary, and corporeal beings. The 
word quadru/ped is common to all animals that 
have fonr legs ; the word dog to all quadrupeds 
of that genus; and the word mastiff lo a spe- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 65 

cies of dog. But Caesar is my dog or yours : 
and though his name may be appropriated to 
ten or twenty dogs, it is proper to each as his 
individual distinction. Common terms belong 
to things. Abstract terms belong to qualities. 
Common terms are used in classification ; ab- 
stract terms are employed in generalization. 

COMPLEX, 

Is that which consists of several elements, 
wdiich are to be separated, or made known by 
analysis. 

CONCEPTION, 

Is the bringing before the mind, by a volun- 
tary act, some image of what has heretofore 
been perceived ; and which yet is thought of 
apart from any distinct recollection of past time, 
otherwise the idea would belong to memory. 
Sensation and perception take place when an 
external object is actually present to the senses. 
Imagination is complex conception ; that is to 
say, it is the joining together of images, in new 
forms, or combinations. We entertain the con- 
ception of a palace; but we imagine a palace 
of gold, or a river of molten brass, or a centaur, 
or a griffin. The power of vivid conception is 



66 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

iaiportant to the poet ; for the mind works from 
the stock of its conceptions, not from its im- 
mediate perceptions : — but it is stiil more im- 
portant to the painter, who can only become a 
mere copyist, if his conceptions are faint or 
confused. Propriety of description, and appro- 
priateness and copiousness in the use of lan- 
guage, depend in a great measure, upon the 
vigor of the facuky of conception. 

CONCLUSION. 

A single affirmation is a proposition : — as that 
A is equaLto B. But if it were necessary to 
prove this equality, by stating, in a series of 
propositions, the component parts of A and B ; 
then this last affirmation, which brought all the 
preceding ones to a point, would be the conclu- 
sion. The last proposition in an argument is 
not called the conclusion because it concludes 
or finishes it ; but because it is the truth, for the 
sake of which all the preceding propositions 
were advanced : — it is that which comprises, or 
sliuts up in one, the train of facts, bringing the 
last into contact with the first, as thus : — ^1. An 
habitual disregard of truth draws upon a man 
the distrust and contempt of all who have to 
do with him. 2. But if a man be the object of 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 67 

distrust and contempt among his neighbours, he 
will be compelled to deal with them always 
under a great disadvantage ; for his most solemn 
asseverations in matters of fact will produce on 
their minds an impression the very reverse of that 
whicii he intends ; so that he becomes his own 
adversary whenever he urges his rights or his 
pretensions. 3. But he who labours under a 
disadvantage of this sort, will find it a bar to 
his success, in whatever he undertakes. 4. 
Therefore^ an habitual disregard of truth wdll, 
in most cases, impede, or utterly prevent a man's 
prosperity. This, then, is our conclusion. 



CONCRETE, 

From concresco, to grow together, or to be 
formed into a mass. When a quality is spoken 
of as joined with other qualities, the word ex- 
pressing it is used in a concrete form ; as ivhite 
paper, equitable conduct ; whiteness and equity 
are abstract terms ; that is to say, the quahties 
are spoken of apart from any particular sub- 
stance. Or all the properties of a thing are 
spoken of together, as a whole, and that whole 
is — the concrete ; — opposed to the abs'tract. 



08 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Tills word, though used often hi an indistinct 
manner, is employed most properly when taken 
to represent the mind's act of looking in upon 
itself] as the subject of all its feehngs and various 
operations. I'he mind, most commonly, is en- 
gaged fully with some sensation, or conception, 
or emotion, or abstract idea ; but sometimes it 
reflects upon itself as the permanent and iden- 
X\Q,?\ feelei' and acto7\ The faculty of memory 
is especially concerned in this notion of con- 
sciousness ; and when the mind thus, and with 
the aid of memory, looks inward, it gains the 
notion of personal identity. It is however plainly 
an error to suppose that identity consists in this 
notion of it ; so that if a man retained no re- 
collection of yesterday, and did not at all think 
of self, he would not in fact be the same to-day 
that he was yesterday. 

CONDITIONAL. 

Whatever will not he, or will not happen, or 
must not be affirmed, unless something else ex- 
ists, or happens, or is true, that dependent fact 
or proposition is conditional. '' If it he fine to- 
morrow, I shall walk to town :" the event of my 
walking then is conditional ; not absolute. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 69 

If virtue is to he tried, men must be placed in 
circumstances wherein they are tempted to do 
wrong That men inust be exposed to temp- 
tation, is not true, or certain, unless it be true, 
that virtue is to be tried. 

CONSEQUENT. 

In a conditional proposition, such as the one 
advanced above, the second affirmation, which 
depends upon the first, is the consequent. 

CONTINGENCY; , 

From contingo, to touch upon, or happen. 
In popular language, whatever event takes place 
of which we do not discern the cause, why it 
should have happened in this manner, or at this 
moment, rather than another, is called a contin- 
gent event ; or an event without a cause : as 
for example, the falling of a leaf on a particular 
spot, or the turning up of a certain number, 
when dice are thrown. 

But any one who reflects must perceive that 
though, in familiar speech, such expressions are 
allowable, there is no philosophical propriety, 
that is to say, no truth in them. 

Contingency and chance are words of no 
positive meaning ; but which may yet be con- 



70 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

veniently employed when we have to express 
our absolute ignorance of the cause of an event. 
The leaf falls on a particular spot in conse- 
quence of the combined influence of gravitation, 
and the movement of the air : and if we cotild 
know precisely the force and direction of the 
wind, when the leaf was floating in the air, we 
might, combining this with the laws of gravita- 
tion, predict the spot on which it would alight : 
— and then, we should no longer speak of that 
event as contingent. The rising of the sun 
to-morrow is not spoken of as a contingent 
event, because it is thought of as certainly fol- 
lowing from the established order of causes. 
But the fineness of to-morrow we think contin- 
gent, because we are ignorant of the many 
causes upon the concurrence of which fine 
weather depends. Yet, if we knew all the laws 
of the atmosphere, and the actual state of the 
lower heavens to-day, then the fineness, or the 
rain and wind of to-morrow, would be spoken 
of just as we speak of the rising of the sun. 

And thus too the future actions of men are 
thought of as contingent, because the motives 
of human conduct are far too multifarious, too 
much hidden, and liable to too many disturbing 
influences from without, to be known, or even 
surmised beforehand. We can go no further 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 71 

in our anticipations of the conduct of men, 
than to say conditionally — if such and such 
events take place, it is probable that M. or 
N. will act in this or that manner. Our 
notion of contingency and of certainty depends 
so much upon our knowledge or ignorance of 
causes, that involuntarily we think an event that 
is to happen to-morrow, much less contingent 
than a similar event that is to take place a year 
hence ; although it is evident, both stand pre- 
cisely upon the same ground, as to the causes 
whence they are to spring, or by which they 
are to be governed. 

Every event has a cause ; in this sense there- 
fore nothing is contingent. But in philoso- 
phical language there is another, and a very 
proper sense of the word contingency, and 
which is nearly synonymous with the word 
condition, and is opposed to the word necessity. 
Mathematical principles are necessary ; that is 
to say, nothing could make them otherwise than 
they are. It cannot even be imagined that the 
three angles of a triangle should be equal to 
less or more than two right angles. The ex- 
istence and attributes of God are also in the 
same sense necessary. But the existence of 
any particular creature, or class of creatures, or 
the actual conformation or powers of such 



72 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

beings, are contingent ; that is to say, they 
might not have existed at all, or they might 
have been otherwise constituted than they are. 

CONVERTIBLE TERMS 

Are such as may be exchanged, the one for 
the other, without affecting the sense, or des- 
stroying the truth of the proposition in which 
they occur. Convertible terms are not always 
synonymous, or of the same meaning abstrac- 
tedly ; but yet they are of the same value in a 
particular instance. Man is responsible to his 
Creator for his conduct — Every moral agent is 
responsible to the Supreme Being for his ac- 
tions. In these two propositions we assert the 
same general truth ; but in other terms, and in 
reference to such a 'proposition, the words man 
and moral agent ; — and the words Creator and 
Supreme Being ; and the words actions and con- 
duct, are convertible ; though not synonymous. 
If they were strictly synonymous, we might 
employ them on all occasions, the one for the 
other without error. But this is not the fact. 
We must not say every moral agent is mortal ; 
for angels are not so ; nor say every man is 
responsible for his actions ; for madmen are 
not so. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 73 

CORRELATIVE TERMS 

Are such as have no sense, strictly speaking, 
apart from some other. Thus the words father 
and son, husband and loife, suppose, or tacitly 
include the other term. The words creature 
and Creator, king and subject, and all adjectives 
of comparison, are correlatives. If we speak 
of something that is better, or greater, or wiser, 
we suppose something worse, or smaller, or 
less wise. 

DATA, 

The plural of datum, a thing given or granted. 
Those facts or principles which are known and 
acknowledged, and from which inferences are 
to be drawn, are called the data : as when the 
actual order and position of mud, clay, sand, 
rock, &c , in the crust of the earth, are de- 
scribed, these are the data, whence some theory 
is to be derived that shall adequately explain 
the formation of that crust. 

DEFINITION. 

To define a thing is to mention some parti- 
cular mark, or circumstance, which universally 
and infallibly distinguishes it from those things 
to which it is most nearly allied. A definition 

4 



74 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

consists of the genus and the difference ; that is 
to say, it mentions the class to which the thing 
belongs ; and then what makes it to differ from 
other things of that class. One infallible mark 
is enough for a definition ; for if an object be 
but made known beyond possibihty of mJstake, 
whatever more is added, contributes nothing to 
our certainty. What is added to a definition is 
description. An elephant is a quadruped (this is 
the genus^ having an elongated and flexible pro- 
boscis (this is the di'fference'). If v^^e go on to 
say that his color is a dingy brown ; his ears 
large and pendulous ; his tail hke that of a hog, 
&c., this is description. 

The definition of words is not Hke the defi- 
nition of things ; for the ideas attached to words 
are variable and vague, and dependent upon the 
knowledge, prejudice, and habits, of those v^ho 
use them. To define the sense of a word is to 
describe the thing, or notion, to which we apply 
it. We can fix our meaning, or secure it 
against mistake, only by declaring, as often as 
necessary, that we intend by it such and such 
things, or notions. By the word virtue, some 
persons understand mere fortitude and manli- 
ness of character ; others understand by it only 
the avoidance of open offences against justice 
and temperance ; while those who think and 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 75 

speak more accurately would apply the word 
virtue to nothing less than that universal good- 
ness which springs from the love of God, and of 
our fellow-creatures. But, in so using it, we 
must guard against common errors by affixing 
to our discourse a description of our notion, 
which may serve to define the sense of the 
term. 

DEMONSTRATION, 

Is a showing or making manifest. Demon- 
strative reasoning is applicable only in those 
cases where the objects to which it relates may 
be fully seen and known, as it were by a glance. 
If some degree of obscurity or uncertainty be- 
longs to any one of the things spoken of, no 
demonstration of the truth of the proposition 
can be had ; or before the argument can proceed 
the obscurity must be cleared up by a full ex- 
amination of the obscure portion of the problem. 
When it is affirmed that 2 and 3 are equal to 
4 and 1, the mind at a glance, or by an instan- 
taneous effort, perceives the truth of the propo- 
sition ; or even if it could be doubted, it might 
be rendered incontestable by taking five coun- 
ters and dividing them into two parcels, first of 
3 and 2, and then of 4 and ] . But if it be 
said that 342 is a 7th part of 2,394, although 



76 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

this affirmation is equally certain and demon- 
strable as the other, there are very few minds 
that would instantaneously perceive the truth of 
it And it will therefore be necessary, before it 
can be intelligently assented to, as an unques- 
tionable truth, to dissect it, if we might so speak, 
or to attend separately, to the particulars of 
which the proposition consists : and in going 
through such a dissection each of these parti- 
culars will be an affirmation or axiom, so simple 
that the truth of it may be perceived at once. 
The arithmetical processes of division, multi- 
plication, &c. are nothing else than concise 
methods of attending in due order to all the 
constituent parts of a complicated proposition, 
and by this means of ascertaining the amount 
of the whole. After we have so attended to 
each part, we may rely as fully upon the truth 
of the result as w^e do upon the certainty of the 
simplest proposition. It makes no difference 
in the certainty of a mathematical product, 
whether the path by which we reach it is long 
or short. Thus for example, to discover at 
what instant of time an echpse of the moon 
will take place fifty years hence, may require a 
very operose and complicated calculation; never- 
theless the fact, though future, may as certainly 
be known as that 3 times 9 are 27. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 77 

The great practical difference between what 
is properly called demonstrative reasoning, and 
the other kinds, is this, that the one is capable 
of being drawn out to any length, without in- 
creasing the probability of error. But in every 
other kind of argument, if we pass circuitously 
through a great number of propositions, several 
of which are in some degree obscure, the pro- 
bability of error is great. In such cases the 
only satisfactory means of attaining certainty 
is by endeavoring to establish the same point in 
several independent lines of argument. But 
when a proposition has been so established by 
two, three, or more series of proofs, w^hich 
though distinct and unconnected, meet all in 
the same point, we may rely upon the result as 
confidently as if it were, in the strictest sense, 
demonstrated. For nothing but truth can give 
consistency to a multitude of insulated facts. 
It is thus that, in courts of justice, the guilt or 
innocence of the accused is placed beyond all 
doubt by the agreement or discrepancy of several 
independent lines of evidence ; as, for example, 
when the accordant testimony of a number of 
unconnected witnesses is confirmed by its coin- 
cidence with facts, the truth of which is ascer- 
tained in some manner that has no connexion 
whatever with that testimony. And it is thus 



78 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

too that the truth of Christianity may, with 
strict propriety, be said to be demonstrated : in- 
asmuch as the assumption of its truth is the 
only means of reconcihng a vast number of in- 
dependent facts, which facts rest upon evidence 
that is not to be disputed. If some o?ie line of 
argument were thought to fall short of absolute 
certainty, the doubt is removed by the agree- 
ment of that single argument with three or four 
other, series, or chains of evidence. 

DESCRIPTION, 

Differs, as we have seen, from definition. A 
description is complete when it has enumerated 
the most obvious or remarkable pecuharities of 
an object ; a definition is complete when it has 
fixed upon the single pecuharity which distin- 
guishes the object from others nearly resem- 
bhng it. 

DESIGN. 

What does not take place by accident, nor 
is effected simply for its own sake ; but is the 
fruit of an intelligent purpose to produce a cer- 
tain effect, is said to be the result of design. 
That is to say, it indicates, not merely the pre- 
sence of some power, producing a change ; but 
of knowledge also, and of choice or intention. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 79 

The fitness or relation of cause and effect, it is 
manifest, has been perceived ; and that same effect 
has been desired by the Power that produced 
it. Design impHes — motive, knowledge, and 
power. When a house is overthrown by a 
hurricane, it is true that the velocity of the air 
was a proper means for effecting the overthow ; 
but there w^as no purpose or intention in the 
tempest to produce this effect. We do not 
always suppose the presence of an intelligent 
power whenever we perceive means conducing 
to an end. As, for example ; if, in travelling 
over a desolate region, we find the trunk of a 
tree, lying across a deep and rapid stream, so 
as to form a bridge, it is by no means certain 
that it was placed there for any such purpose ; 
it may have fallen in that position from the spot 
where it grew, in consequence of the decay of 
the root on the side next the stream. Some 
other than an intelligent cause might have pro- 
duced the effect. But if we find three or four 
trunks of trees, laid in order across the stream, 
and firmly bound together, there is then not 
merely a combination of things subserving an 
important purpose — not merely a fortunate co- 
incidence, but it is such a combination as be- 
speaks intelligence : there is a language in this 
combination which we understand, and w^hich 



80 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

says — a mind — a knowing poiver has brought 
these things together, and for a specific purpose. 
It is then, 1st, a combination of parts ; and, 2d, 
a combination effecting some special object ; 
and, 3d, a combination showing that the real 
relations of things have been understood, which 
proves the existence of an intelligent cause. It 
is thus that we infer irresistibly the being and 
agency of the omnipotent and omniscient 
Creator from the organization of plants and 
animals ; and indeed from the entire structure 
of the material svstem. 

DIFFERENCE, 

In a logical sense, is that one quality, or cir- 
cumstance, which distinguishes a thing, or a set 
of things, from others which it resembles in 
other respects. 

The diference makes the species within a 
genus ; and to name the genus and the differ- 
ence, is to give a definition. The circumstance 
of not shedding its fohage in winter, is the 
difference which distinguishes one species of 
oak from others. 

DISJUNCTIVE PROPOSITIONS, ' 

Are those in which something is affirmed as 
true of so7ne one, of two or more things that 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 81 

are mentioned ; as — The vase was broken by 
James, or Thomas, or John ; one of the three 
must have broken it. If then we can prove 
that it was not broken by James, nor by 
John, the conckision follows that Thomas 
broke it. 

DILEMMA : 

AiX7](X(jia, when two conditional propositions 
are advanced, out of which a choice must be 
made, a dilemma, or, taking hold of two ways, 
is said to be presented : as thus ; it might be 
said to a servant, " You were present when 
your master's house was plundered ; or you 
were not. If present, you connived at the rob- 
bery, by not resisting or revealing it. If absent, 
you abandoned what had been committed to 
your care ; and, therefore, in either case, you are 
culpable." The servant in this case could not 
escape from the dilemma. 

DISPOSITION. 

To dispose, is to place a multitude of things 
in a particular order, for the sake of conveni- 
ence. The word arrangement, which is nearly 
of the same meaning, is properly apphed to 
things : the word disposition, to the ideas or 
themes of a discourse. 

4* 



82 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

DISTINCTION, 

Is the expressing, in words, some difference 
which has been observed. To make a distinc- 
tion without a difference, is, therefore, to utter 
an unmeaning proposition : as if one were to 
say, " I deprived jou of jour riglits ; but I did 
you no wrong." 

DISTRIBUTION, 

Is the assigning of things to the places or 
compartments which have been prepared to re- 
ceive them. There must aheady have been a 
classification of some kind, when a distribution 
is made. Minds fond of classification, and of 
order, think very much by the method of dis- 
tribution ; that is to say, whatever new subject 
is presented to their consideration, they rid 
themselves of perplexity, not so much by a 
strict and true analysis of it, as by distributing 
.the parts of which it seems to consist, accord- 
ing to their customary mode of classifying 
all things. 

DIVISION, 

Is the separating one and the same thing 
into parts, or parcels, one of which is of the 
same quahty as another ; it is therefore distin- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 83 

gaislied from analysis, which is the separation 
of the unlike component parts of a compound 
body. 

DOUBT, 

Is some degree of belief, or supposition, that 
what has been affirmed is true. Disbelief is 
hioxdedge that it is not true. To admit a propo- 
sition carelessly, or without regard to evidence, 
is credulity : to affirm such a proposition posi- 
tively, and authoritatively, is dogmatism. To 
refuse assent to evidence, proportioned to its 
force or validity, is scepticism ; that is to say, it 
is to prefer doubt or ignorance to knowledge, 
in some instance where a degree of certainty is 
actually attainable. For any one to profess to 
disbeheve a proposition when he does not know 
that it is false, is an absurdity of the same sort 
as to embrace opinions without evidence : it is 
a real dogmatism concealed under the affiscta- 
tion of avoiding dogmatism. 

DURATION 

Is successive existence. Time is successive 
existence measured into equal parts. We acquire 
the notion of duration, or of continuous exist- 
ence, thus : — when a thought, or sensation, 
or feeling, ceases to engage the principal atten- 



84 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

tion of the mind, it does not instantaneously 
and entirely disappear ; but seems gradually to 
fade or retire, while another image or sensation 
is taking its place ; just as when, in travelling, 
the objects we have passed keep in sight for a 
while. The mind does not pass from one state 
to another by sudden starts, but by insensible 
transitions. We learn in this manner to think 
of continued existence, or of successive con- 
sciousness. And moreover by the constitution 
of the mind, an image, or sensation, or feeling 
often returns to it after a long interval has 
elapsed, accompanied by the particular circum- 
stances which were joined with it when first it 
occurred ; and we are then impressed with the 
conviction that it is not new to the mind, but a 
repetition only of what long ago occupied the 
thoughts : this is memory ; and memory, to- 
gether with the insensible passage of the mind 
from one state to another, imparts the notion of 
duration. In a manner analogous to this, we 
acquire the notion of extension by touching 
successively the contiguous parts of a solid body, 
and by fixing the eye, successively, upon its 
parts. The notion of extension is acquired by 
means of the senses ; the notion of duration is 
purely mental. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 85 

EFFECT, 

Is, in a strict sense, a ciiange produced by 
poioer (see Cause) ; but, in popular language, 
whatever event invariably and immediately fol- 
lows another, in such way that the idea of 
power may be attributed to the first, is called 
its effect. Thus, the dissolving of ice before 
the fire, is said to be the effect of heat ; it being 
supposed that heat has a power to dissolve 
ice. But if the facts be examined more atten- 
tively, it will seem quite as proper to say that 
water, in a solid state, has a power to bring 
heat into combination with itself, as to speak 
of the power of heat. The fluidity of water 
is the result of a mixture which takes place 
where the two elements are brought into con- 
tact ; and it is fair to presume that it takes 
place in consequence of a fitness of the one 
to the other. 

ESSENCE. 

All those properties, or qualities, which are 
supposed to be necessary to any thing, or with- 
out which it could not exist, are, when so 
existing together, deemed to constitute its 
essence. These essential qualities are dis- 
tinguished from such as are accidental, or separ- 
able, or are mere adjuncts. Tbree right lines 



86 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

joining are the essence of a triangle ; if one 
be wanting, or if tlie three do not fall one upon 
another, there is no triangle. But whether this 
triangle be formed by the tracing of ink upon 
paper, or by the junction of beams in a build- 
ing, or by the stretching of cords on the earth, 
is a mere circumstance, not affecting the essence, 
and not altering any of its properties. A living 
body united to a reasonable soul, is the essence 
of a man : the form of that body may be 
varied, or its parts removed, and the dispositions 
of the mind changed : but the man remains, so 
long as body and soul are united. 



EVIDENCE, 

Is a fact, or a series of facts, adduced for the 
purpose of proving the truth of some other fact 
that has been affirmed. It is asserted that John 
Smith stole Samuel Brown's coat, and the 
evidence adduced is, the two facts, 1st, that 
John was seen to enter Samuel's apartment, 
during his absence ; and, 2d, that a coat, which 
Samuel knows to be his own, was found in 
John's possession : very little is wanting in this 
evidence to render it a complete proof of the al- 
leged theft, audit maybe deemed absolutely con- 
clusive, if the additional fact can be ascertained, 
that John had been overheard, before the theft, 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 87 

agreeing with a companion for tiie sale of 
Samuel's coat, if he could steal it. The con- 
clusiveness of evidence consists in such a con- 
junction of a number cf facts, that there re- 
mains only one way in which they can all be 
consistently explained ; and when that oneway 
does actually bring them all to an agreement. 

EXISTENCE, 

Is the same as being. That ^which is, is 
said abstractedly to he, or to have exigence. 

EXPERIMENT, 

When what is passing before our eyes is at- 
tentively observed, for the purpose of acquiring 
a knowledge of the causes, or established order 
of things, we are said to learn by observation. 
But we learn by experiment, when, for the same 
purpose, we put what we suppose to be causes, 
in operation. After certain events have been 
observed to take place, we form a conjecture as 
to the cause of them ; and on the ground of 
this conjecture, or hypothesis, as it is called, we 
make experiments. For example; if the cause 
of the aurora borealis, or northern hghts, is 
sought for, we observe the appearances they 
assume at different times ; and by comparing 



88 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

these appearances — the colors, the coruscations, 
the movements — with those of the electric fluid, 
or of ignited gases, or of phosphoric fluids, we 
endeavor to trace the effect to its cause ; or, at 
least^ to establish a probable supposition on the 
subject. But these aerial changes are far 
beyond our reach, and therefore cannot be sub- 
jected to experiment. Not so that other at- 
mospheric phenomenon — thunder and lightning. 
Dr. Franklin surmised that lightning is the 
same active and brilhant element which is pro- 
duced by the friction of amber, and some other 
substances. This was his hypothesis, or sup- 
position. To ascertain its truth, he flew a kite 
beneath a thunder cloud, having a small wire 
attached to the string. From the lower end of 
this wire he drew sparks which exhibited all 
the properties and appearances of those pro- 
duced by an electrical machine : this experi- 
ment proved his first conjecture to have been 
well founded. The science of chemistry is al- 
most wholly founded upon experiment : that is, 
the bringing of various substances together, for 
the purpose of discovering in what manner they 
act, one upon another. The mere observation 
of such chemical changes as take place in the 
course of nature, would afford a very limited 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 89 

knowledge on such subjects, and would leave 
almost all doubtful matters undecided. 

EXTENSION. 

The notion acquired by the sense of touch, 
in moving the hand on the surface of a solid 
body, and by comparing this sensation with the 
sight of the same body, conveys to the mind 
the notion of extension. From this abstract 
idea we may separate the idea of solidity, or 
resistance, and it is then designated by the word 
space. Or we may add to it the idea of succes- 
sive parts, numbered, and we gain the notion of 
distance. Or again, to the notion of extension 
may be added the idea of successive points, re- 
lated to each other, and we then think oi figure 
or shape. 

FACT. 

Either a particular event, proper to be ad- 
duced as evidence, in proof of something affirm- 
ed ; or a common event, happening in the ordi- 
nary course of nature, and proper, therefore, to 
form part of an inductive argument (see Induc- 
tion), is called a fact. In the former sense, 
facts are the basis of judicial proceedings. A 
series of facts constitute a history. In the latter 
sense, facts are the materials from which the 
physical sciences are formed. 



90 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

FALLACY, 

An argument which seems condusive, but is 
not so, is fallacious ; that is to say, deceptive. 
When such fallacies are designedly framed, for 
the purpose of misleading those to whom they 
are addressed, they are called sophisms. A fal- 
lacy takes place — ]st, When some one of the 
things affirmed in an argument, and wdiich is 
important to the conclusion, is not true. 2d, 
When the connexion between one fact and 
another is not truly stated. 3d, When the 
words implied are used in one sense, in one 
part of the argument, and in another, in another 
part: or wdien the sense assigned to such terms 
is so vague or ambiguous, that an error slips in, 
as it were, unperceived, in the course of the 
argument. For instance : the argument by 
which papists defend the usurpation of the 
bishop of Rome is fallacious, because the facts 
affirmed are not true, or not known to be as 
they are stated. Our Lord, it is said, conferred 
upon St. Peter a universal power, or jurisdic- 
tion, over the souls and consciences of all man- 
kind ; this authority St. Peter transferred to his 
successor, the first bishop of Rome ; and it has, 
in like manner, been handed down from bishop 
to bishop, through all ages. To resist the au- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 91 

thority of the pope, is therefore to rebel against 
the Lord. Now even if it were granted that 
St. Peter received an authority of this kind 
from Christ, it is not true, or at least can never 
be proved to be so, that he transferred it to any 
other. Again, it is not true, or can never be 
proved to be so, that the first bishop of Rome 
was appointed by St. Peter, or was in any 
other sense his successor, than that in which 
Clemens, and Polycarp, and Ignatius, were the 
successors of Paul, and John, and Peter. This 
argument is also fallacious by its taking for 
granted the connexion of one fact (even if in 
itself true) with another. Again ; the pretended 
proof of the real presence of Christ's body in 
the sacramental bread, is a fallacy, by attribut- 
ing a literal sense to words which the nature of 
the subject, as well as our Lord's usual mode 
of teaching, demands to be understood in a 
tropical or figurative sense. And that such is 
the true value of the words is proved by apply- 
ing the same rule of interpretation to other 
instances. To detect fallacies, requires that 
the truth of all the facts either affirmed ox iinplied, 
should be inquired into ; that the alleged depen- 
dence of one fact upon another should be ex- 
amined ; and, that the sense assigned to each of 
the important terms should be ascertained. 



92 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

GENERALIZATION, 

In the strictest sense, is gathering up, from 
a multitude of facts, a conclusion, or inference, 
or rule, which is apphcable to all, or which is 
suggested by all. By an effort of abstraction, 
we separate some one property, or pecuHarity, 
from among others ; and after observing this 
peculiarity in a number of instances, we di- 
gest, or bring together, the common part of all 
the instances : this mental process is generaliza- 
tion. The propensity to generalize, constitutes 
what is called the philosophical temper. It is 
a desire to know, not particular facts, but those 
universal facts which, when known, enable us 
to explain whatever particular facts present 
themselves to our notice. When the tendency 
of a certain mode of conduct, as, for instance, 
procrastination, has been observed in a great 
number of cases, we bring the conviction 
that has gradually formed itself in our mind, 
into the form of a general proposition, which, 
though it may be worded variously, contains 
the principle, or truth — that, to defer till to- 
morrow what should be done to-day, is a course 
of conduct which often ends in ruin or disgrace. 
This general truth \\q may safely apply to any 
new instance of the same kind, and may pre- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 93 

diet the issue, as at least probable. Or, when 
we learn from history that nations addicted to 
agriculture have been easily subjugated, unless 
they were also, to some considerable extent, 
commercial, we derive the general inference — 
that the combination of agriculture and com- 
merce is favorable to the political strength of a 
nation. The process of deriving these infer- 
ences from a number of facts, is generahzation. 

GENUS and SPECIES, 

Are correlative terms, the one having no 
meaning apart from the other. The resem- 
blance or sameness of many things that are not 
absolutely alike, brings them together in our 
minds ; and we call the collection a genus, or 
family. When the differences which distin- 
guish some from others is noted, we distribute 
them into species. (See Definition and 
Difference.) 

HYPOTHESIS, 

From u'TT'o^sfl'i^, a supposition. Experiments, 
made with the intention of discovering the 
causes of the effects we observe, would be vague 
and fruitless, if we did not, in each instance, 
follow some probable conjecture or hypothesis. 



94 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

That is to say, a cause is first guessed at, and 
then experiments are instituted for the purpose 
of trying whether we have been right or 
wrong in our surmise. If wrong, we guess 
again, and make a new trial. An hypothesis, 
therefore, is not an unproved supposition, to 
which we give an idle assent ; but a means, or 
instrument for gaining true knowledge. The 
instance adduced uuder the word Experiment, 
may be again referred to, for showing the use 
of an hypothesis. The American philosopher 
asked, " What is lightning ?" His supposition 
or hypothesis was — it is electricity — or the 
brilliant and active fire which is generated by 
the friction or resin, or amber. It was to prove 
or disprove his hypothesis that he made his ex- 
periment. Or, to take another example : we 
have observed that a certain spot in a meadow 
produces a greater quantity of grass than the 
rest of the field. We remember, too, that a 
heap of various matters, rubbish, ashes, litter, 
&c. had for some time lain upon that spot ; now 
(supposing that we were entirely ignorant of 
the virtues of manure) we should, as it were 
involuntarily, imagine that the heap of rubbish 
had been, in some way, the cause of the su- 
perior fertility of the spot. To ascertain the 
correctness of this hypothesis, we cover another 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 95 

spot with earth, or sand, in order to find whether 
the mere circumstance of covering the sward, 
for a time, was the reason of the fact in ques- 
tion. But no such effect is found to be pro- 
duced in this instance. Our next supposition 
is, that some one of the several matters con- 
tained in the first heap was the true cause we 
are in search of, and we proceed to deposit a 
parcel of each ingredient — ashes, sea-weed, 
stable litter, decayed vegetables, &c. separately, 
on different spots ; and, after the lapse of some 
time, observe that, on one there is no increased 
fertility, while the others exhibit increased ver- 
dure in various degrees. This experiment, or 
trial, has determined our hypothesis. It is in 
this manner that all substantial knowledge of 
the laws of nature is acquired. And almost 
every addition to our knowledge suggests some 
new hypothesis, and leads to new discoveries. 

IDEA. 

This word is often applied to any kind of 
thought, or notion, or behef ; but its more proper 
use is restricted to such thoughts as are images 
of visible objects, whether actually seen and 
remembered, or compounded by the faculty of 



96 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

imagination. The words notion, or opinion, 
would often be well substituted for the word 
idea. 

IDENTITY, 

Is absolute sameness in substance ; and is 
affirmed more usually of persons, than of 
things. John yesterday, and John ten years 
ago, and to-day, is identically the same person, 
although the matter of his body has undergone 
many changes, as well as the dispositions and 
habits of his mind. The conviction or con- 
sciousness of personal identity, or of continued 
sameness, from the commencement to the end 
of hfe, is conveyed by memory ; but does not 
depend upon, or consist in memory. A man 
who by disease, or intemperance, loses all recol- 
lection of his early years, does not cease to be 
the same person, though he is ignorant of being 
so. We grant that to be identically the same, 
through a long course of time, which has un- 
dergone none but gradual and partial changes. 
It is thus that the human body, in its course 
from infancy to age, is thought of as identically 
the same. The identity of the soul, or rational 
power, is believed to depend upon its unalter- 
able and imperishable spirituality. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 97 

IMAGINATION. 

The power of the mind to decompose its 
conceptions, and to recombine the elements of 
them at its pleasm'e, is called its faculty of ima- 
gination. Imagination is distinguished from 
memory, not merely by the activity of the mind 
in the former case, but by the diversified com- 
position of its ideas. To think of the heavens, 
as glowing hke a furnace, and peopled with 
aerial armies, is to imagine, or to bring together 
the parts of many actual conceptions. This 
sort of mental creation is carried on, usually, 
under the influence of the taste for what is 
beautiful and sublime. To imagine things 
neither pleasing, nor grand, nor in any w^ay 
adapted to excite agreeable emotions, belongs 
to a fantastic or disordered mind. Poetical 
genius seems to include, 1st, A power of ab- 
straction in the senses, which enables the mind 
to separate the qualities and appearances of 
objects one from another : for unless they were 
so separated, they would not offer themselves 
ready for recombination ; 2d, A power of vivid 
conception ; 3d, A great susceptibility to the 
emotions of beauty and sublimity ; 4th, A 
prompt correspondence between these emotions 
and the moral sentiments; 5th, A nice judg- 

5 



98 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

ment, in fixing the boundary between sobriety 
and extravagance ; 6th, A quick recollection 
of words : and 7th, An ear, or sense of the 
rhythm, or mutual relations of words, as mere 
sounds. 

IMPOSSIBLE ; 

That which cannot be affirmed, or imagined, 
without involving some absurdity ; as, that all 
the parts of a thing together should make more 
or less than the whole. When it is said, as 
sometimes, that it is impossible that God should 
do so and so, all that can be properly intended 
is, that a contradiction in terms, or a direct 
absurdity, is contained in the supposition of the 
contrary. 

IMPRESSION. 

Whenever, either through the senses, or from 
its own feelings, the mind has undergone a 
change, or has passed from one state to another, 
passively, it is said to have received an impi'es- 
sion — in allusion to the image that is imprinted 
upon softened wax. 

INDEFINITE PROPOSITIONS, 

Are those which do not limit the affirmation 
they contain, or declare whether it be universal, 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 99 

or proper to a part, or an individual. "Men 
are creatures of habit," might be understood 
to mean, that inaiiy men, or so7ne men are so ; 
though the nature of the proposition imphes 
that it is intended to be universal. An indefi- 
nite form of speaking is proper when no ambi- 
guity is likely to arise ; as if it were said, 
" Men are mortal ;" but then the abstract form 
is preferable — " Man is mortal." If it were 
said — " Men are knaves," the indefinite form of 
the proposition would seem to convey a false 
assertion — namely, that all men are knaves. 

INDUCTION, 

Is the drawing, or leading ofi' an inference, 
or general fact, from a number of instances. 
Or, it is the summing up of the result of obser- 
vations and experiments. It was Lord Bacon 
who introduced this term into philosophy ; and 
who moreover taught the true method of ac- 
quiring a knowledge of the laws of nature, by 
attending to facts, and by carefully comparing 
a great number of instances ; instead of the old 
method of philosophising, which consisted in 
forming a theory, or supposition, independently 
of all facts, and then explaining the appear- 
ances of nature on the blind assumption that 



100 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

the theory was true. The old method was the 
shortest and easiest ; but it was utterly falla- 
cious. The modern, or Baconian method, is 
laborious, and difficult ; but it is successful, and 
has proved in the highest degree beneficial. 
See the words Experiment and Hypothesis. 



INFERENCE. 

Is a fact or truth, affirmed on the ground of 
its known or supposed connexion with some 
other fact, or truth, which is already established, 
or admitted. A. and B. are known, or beheved, 
to be inseparable companions : if therefore we 
see A. we infe?' that B. is not far distant. The 
confidence with which we rely upon the truth 
of inferences, results from that persuasion, 
which is natural to the human mind, and which 
is insensibly produced by the uniformity of 
nature (and it springs also from the conscious- 
ness of power) that every effect has a cause, 
and that the connexion betw^een causes and 
effects is invariable : or that events which have 
been seen constantly to succeed one the other, 
in a certain order, will continue to do so. The 
manner in which inferences are to be drawn from 
facts, may be thus exemplified : — On landing 
upon an unknown shore, we observe the prints 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 101 

of human feet on the sands, and infei' that the 
country is inhabited ; for the mould of a human 
foot must be the result, not of the impression of 
the waves, but of a cause proper to its produc- 
tion ; and this can be nothing else but the foot of 
man. These prints are fresh, and are found below 
the level of high water. — We infer then again, 
that some human being is not far distant ; for 
the action of the waves must (according to the 
established order of nature) have obliterated 
them, had they- been impressed before the last 
flow of the tide. Again, the prints are those, 
not only of naked feet, but of feet that have 
never been confined by the habit of wearing 
shoes: — it is then probable, if not certain, that 
these men are savages. In these instances of 
assuming a fact, of which we have none but 
indirect evidence, all the confidence of our be- 
lief springs from the persuasion, both that every 
effect must have a cause, and that every effect must 
have a cause suited to it, in ah its conditions. Or, 
in other words, that e^exj part, ^n^ property, and 
circumstance of an effect, must have a cause pro- 
per to itself. Independently of any process of 
reasoning, effects with which we are familiar, 
instantaneously suggest to the mind their causes ; 
—the inference is immediate. 

Inferences are liable to be erroneous, chiefly 



102 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

from two causes : 1st, Certain events are sup- 
posed to be connected, as cause and effect, 
when the connexion between them is in truth 
merely accidental. Superstitious inferences 
are of this sort ; as, for instance, when some 
trivial occurrence, or simple accident, is supposed 
to be a prognostic of calamity or death, because 
in fact it has happened more than once soon 
before some such disastrous event. This is a 
false inference, because there is no real con- 
nexion between such occurrences and the mis- 
fortunes or death with which they have been 
associated. 2dly, Inferences are false, when, 
from among two or more causes that might 
have produced a certain effect, we hastily fix 
upon one, without attending to the others ; as 
thus : — A letter is received professing to contain 
a note or cheque ; but it is not in fact there ; 
and moreover the seal presents some appear- 
ance of having been broken, and repaired ; and 
the letter passed through the hands of a servant, 
whose integrity we have some reason to doubt 
The inference which immediately suggests itself 
is, that this servant has withdrawn the note. 
But it is not a conclusive inference, and may 
actually appear to have been a false one. On 
writing to his correspondent, the person learns 
that, after he had sealed the letter, he re-opened 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 103 

it to add a postscript, and that, in so doing, the 
note fell out, and was not seen until after the 
letter was dispatched. This mode of account- 
ing for the fact might have been imagined, as 
well as several other suppositions, and ought to 
have prevented the hasty inference which im- 
phed the dishonesty of the servaot. Nothing 
is more characteristic of a sound and calm mind, 
than the habit of suspending the judgment 
when evidence is ambiguous ; or of abstaining 
from plausible but inconclusive inferences. 
Weak minds from fear, and ardent minds from 
presumption, usually ^x upon the first or most 
obvious inference which the circumstances of 
the case suggest. The important distinction 
between a conjecture and an inference should 
always be kept in mind : the former is the sup- 
position of a particular cause, where more than 
one are before us, from which to choose. An 
inference, when just, is the only cause that can 
be rationally assumed, by which to account for 
the effect in question. 

INFINITE ; 

That which has no limits ; or to which limits 
have not actually been assigned. A line is said 
to be infinite, though not more than an inch in 



104 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

length, if drawn as a mere line, without regard 
to its length : a finite line is one that is bounded 
by two given, or known points. The word 
infinite is very frequently used improperly, in- 
stead of the woxdiS pe7'fext, or absolute. When 
qualities are spoken of which can neither be 
numbered or measured, there can be no proper 
idea attached to the phrase, if they are called 
either finite or infinite. Snow is not infinitely, 
but perfectly white. If the divine attributes of 
wisdom, power, goodness, are spoken of as in- 
finite, it is only by an allowable accoimnodation 
of the term. All that is intended is, that the 
perfections of the Divine Being surpass all our 
knowledge, or faculties of comprehension. 
God is perfectly, and absolutely, rather than in- 
finitely, wise, holy, and good. 

INSTINCT. 

Many of the animal tribes, and insects, and 
especially birds, perform operations which imply, 
not merely forethought, and a calculation of 
cause and effect, but a perfect knowledge of the 
most diflficult problems of geometry ; as, for in- 
stance — the construction of the honey-comb, 
which, in the figure and combination of the 
cells, is strictly conformed to the highest mathe- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 105 

matical principles. And yet this knowledge 
cannot be imagined to reside in the animal. 
For if it did, we should see that it would be 
more or less perfect in different individuals ; and 
would be improved by experience, and would 
show itself in other modes,and on oth er occasions ; 
and we should almost certainly find mistakes to 
be sometimes committed. Bat the contrary in 
all these points is the fact. We are compelled, 
therefore, to impute the knowledge and the fore- 
thought to the Creator, and to consider the 
animal only as the unconscious or unreasoning 
instrument of what it performs. This blind 
mode of operation — quite inconceivable by the 
human mind, is what we mean by the word 
Instinct. Reason, as distinguished from instinct, 
is the knowledge of the relation between 
means and end ; or cause and effect. And in 
this sense animals are, though in an inferior 
degree, endowed with reason. They act just 
as man acts, from knowledge and forethought, 
in a considerable part of their movements. 

INTELLECTUAL POWERS, 

Are distinguished from the animal appetites, 
and from the moral faculties, or sensibilities : 
that is to say, from all mere sensations, and 

5* 



106 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

desires, and emotions, and tastes. To perceive 
external objects, to conceive of them, to re- 
member, to imagine, to compare, to judge, to 
abstract, and to analyse, to connect thought 
with thought, according to the real relation be- 
tween one notion and another ; — these are the 
employments of the intellectual powers ; and 
these occupations of the mind, though most 
often, if not always connected with, or preced- 
ed, or followed by desires or emotions, of some 
sort, are essentially different from loving, hating, 
fearing, hoping, &c. 

INTUITION, 

From intueor, to look upon, or to look into 
with some attention. Whatever relation of one 
thing to another may be perceived or under- 
stood instantly, and without the aid of any in- 
termediate comparisons, is said to be known by 
intuition: as that these two lines are of equal 
length. 



But if it were affirmed that these 



are to each other as seven is to ten, very few 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. ' 107 

persons would intuitively/ perceive the truth of the 
assertion ; and to prove it we must have recourse 
to a comparison of the parts of both ; or, in 
other words, to a number of intuitions. This 
sort of proof is a demonstration which differs 
from intuition, by its consisting of several in- 
tuitive truths. Truths intuitively perceived are 
called axioms. 

INVENTION. 

This word, though derived from the Latin 
invenio, to find, or meet with, has acquired a 
different sense, and signifies to devise, or iiiiagine, 
or to put together. It is thus applied to two 
very different operations of the mind, namely, 
poetical, and mechanical invention. Poetical 
invention is the bringing together images and 
sentiments adapted to excite certain pleasurable 
emotions, or to enkindle the imagination, and 
gratify taste ; and it depends upon the ready 
perception of external resemblances, or apparent 
analogies. But mechanical invention results 
from an effort of abstraction, in discerning and 
bringing together certain properties of bodies, 
for the production of a particular result. An 
end is proposed ; as for instance, the raising of 
a massive stone to its lofty place in a building. 
How shall this be done I — naked human strength 



108 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 



is altogether insufficient. In what way then 
may human strength, or other forces, be appUed 
to the stone with such advantage as shall render 
the operation facile, safe, and not too costly ] 
The exchange between power and time, which 
is effected by the lever, the inchned plane, the 
screw, the pulley, are then thought of, and a 
choice is made, first among these various means, 
and then among the various modes of applying 
each. 

The vast difference between the reasoning 
faculty of man and animals, is especially dis- 
played in the extent to which the power of 
devising means for the attainment of an end is 
carried by man, in consequence of his greater 
power of abstraction: — the most simple instru- 
ment, or tool, is a product of the faculty of ab- 
straction ; nor is there reason to suppose that, 
even if the paws of animals were better fitted 
than they are to the holding of tools, animals 
could construct or employ them, unless their 
mental faculties were also enlarged. 

Men and beasts alike betake themselves to 
the shelter of trees, or rocks, during a storm ; 
thus far they both seek to accomplish an end 
by the use of means. But the animal advances 
no further than to recollect, on after occasions, 
the connexion between the tree, or rock, and 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 109 

the feeling of protection from rain and wind, 
which it has afforded. Man not merely re- 
members this connexion, but thinks abstract- 
edly of the several objects which have screened 
him from the tempest He thinks of shelter ; 
this is an abstract notion, and having formed it, 
whether consciously or not to himself, he per- 
ceives that it may belong to other things than 
the tree, or the rock, or the cavern ; and he 
brings together, in the most advantageous 
manner, such materials as will, when so united, 
realize most completely his abstract idea :— -the 
hut of the savage, constructed of rough branches 
and wattled boughs and leaves and dried grass, 
is nothing else than the embodying of an ab- 
straction. The same may be said of all, even 
the most finished works of human ingenuity. 
When animals — the bee, or the beaver, or the 
white ant — embody an abstract idea, they do 
so in an invariable manner : — they commit no 
blunders ;-~make no improvements ; — and ex- 
ercise their skill at once, and without instruction. 
This is manifestly not the product of a mental 
process, like that of man, when he exercises 
invention. We must therefore attribute the 
knowledge to the Creator, and designate the 
unintelligent agency by another term ; or call 
it INSTINCT. Invention is distinguished from 



110 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

discovery, which is the finding out something 
ah*eady existing ; whereas invention is a sort of 
creation. The finding out the polarity of 
the magnet was a discovery : the apphcation of 
that discovery to the purposes of navigation, 
by suspending a magnetic wire on a pivot, over 
a circular index, was an invention. 

JUDGMENT, 

Is the action of the mind in deciding, or pro- 
nouncing, concerning two things, when placed 
in comparison, that they are equal, or unequal ; 
hke, or unhke ; that the one contains the other, 
or bears such or such a relation to it. It is by 
successive judgmeMs, or by the regular compar- 
ing of one idea or notion with another, until 
we reach some one which at first was seen in 
the distance, that a process of reasoning is 
carried on. 

The excellence of the judgment, as a faculty 
of the mind, depends, in the first place, upon 
the clearness of its ideas, the precision or ex- 
actness of its power of abstraction ; and upon its 
power of attention. But the moral character, or 
the habitual motives of the mind, have very 
much to do with the soundness and excellence 
of the judgment. This will appear if we ex- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. Ill 

amine the real meaning of those epithets which 
are most frequently applied to the judgment, 
by way of distinction. Most of them express 
the freedom of the mind from some sort of pre- 
judice, or improper motive, or disturbing in- 
fluence. The mind never acts without some 
motive ; now the ruling motive, when it is to 
exercise judgment, should manifestly be — the 
desire to arrive at a true result. A nd this motive 
should be both vivid and permanent, or it will 
not prevail over opposite impulses, or over the 
inertness of the mind. The phrase, a sound 
judgment, means that the mind has so healthy, 
or vigorous a habit of pursuing truth, that it is 
not diverted or led astray by those tastes, or 
prejudices, or preferences, which are always at 
hand to influence our decisions. A calm judg- 
ment is one which is not swayed or intimidated 
by the passions or vehemence of other men ; or 
which can serenely carry on its intellectual 
operations, amid many surrounding agitations. 
A cool judgment is nearly the same thing ; or 
if distinguishable from the calmness of the judg- 
ment, it refers to freedom from external disturb- 
ances : while coolness relates to such as are in- 
ternal ; namely — a nervous irritability of the 
body ; a lively and excitable imagination ; an 
excessive sensibility of the moral feelings ; — or 



112 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

the prevalence of malignant passions. Those 
who are distinguished by this calmness and 
coolness of judgment possess a great advantage 
in their transactions with others ; for it is a rare 
excellence, and enables a man both to attain a 
true result more certainly, and to attain it more 
speedily than those with whom he has to 
do. While they are carried hither and thither, 
by their prejudices, their wishes, their hopes, or 
their fears, he has gained a just view of the 
business in question ; and is, at his leisure, cal- 
culating all the consequences of the line of con- 
duct he means to pursue. It may however be 
observed, that this calmness and coolness of 
mind, when belonging to vulgarity and sordid- 
ness of character, commonly generates a self- 
conceit, or vanity, which becomes an indirect 
motive, and leads the understanding astray. 
Men of this sort, in order to gain the immediate 
gratification of having reached an unfair ad- 
vantage over the simple, confine their views to 
the present moment ; and while they snatch at 
a trifling profit, are blind to their own greater 
and future interests. Cunning, or worldly wis- 
dom, is the usual designation of this sort of 
intellectual short-sightedness, which is produced 
in vain and vulgar minds that possess the ad- 
vantage of a cool judgment. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 113 

The epithets acute, profound, and comprehen- 
sive, applied to tlie judgment, express different 
degiees, or kinds, of o^ctivity, and oi force, in 
the intellect. Next to the many perverting 
motives which are the great sources of errors 
of judgment, a principal cause of false or im- 
perfect conclusions is that indolence, or inert- 
ness, from which verj few minds are akogether 
exempt. In many minds intellectual action 
ceases, or falters, hefore the process of compar- 
ing objects or notions is completed. These 
unfinished comparisons, if deemed to be perfect, 
are necessarily false judgments. The activity, 
or the energy, which resists this inertness, dis- 
plays itself in different modes, as for example : 
— A mind that is capable of a short vigorous 
effort, will complete a single process of thought, 
and produce a perfect comparison of two or 
three objects. This is what constitutes an acute 
judgment. A profound judgment is one that is 
capable of long-continued and patient exertion, 
and in which the desire of truth is tranquil and 
steady, so that every comparison is carefully 
made, and the entire series of comparisons is 
pursued, until the matter in question is examined 
in all its breadth and depth. 

When a vivid and steady desire of truth is 
conjoined with modesty and with great tran- 



114 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

qQillity, and ingenuousness of temper, there will 
be a frequent return of the mind to the same 
subject, as if to examine anew its former con- 
clusions. This will leave room for the admis- 
sion of new considerations, which heretofore 
may have been neglected ; and thus frequent 
amendments, or revisions of such conclusions 
will take place : and a habit will be formed of 
suspending the mental process in expectation 
of new hght or more evidence. These habits 
form what is termed a co?7iprekensi2Je indgment ; 
or an enlarged mode of thinking. Acute minds 
are often hurried into error from the want of 
this sort of revision of their opinions ; and pro- 
found minds are liable to err by the too con- 
tinuous and unbroken fixing of the mind upon 
a single train of ideas ; so that facts or princi- 
ples which, though nearly connected with the 
subject before them, lie on one side, are over- 
looked.- — It is thus often that the learned lose 
themselves in depths, where common minds 
easily find their way. Acuteness, profoundness, 
and even comprehensiveness of judgment, are 
not seldom found apart from evenness or serenity 
of temper ; in such cases the intellectual excel- 
lence shows itself only in favorable seasons, or 
when no vivid motive agitates the spirit. Some 
persons exhibit consummate abihty, and great 



ELEMENTS OFTHOUGHT. 115 

soundness of judo;ment in managing other men's 
affairs, or in giving advice w^here they are not 
personally interested ; though ihey invariably 
mismanage their oivn concerns : — -in their own 
concerns, their intellectual faculties are perturbed 
by their hopes, fears, passions, or anxieties. It 
is thus, often, that studious men, who display 
the highest degree of acuteness or force of 
mind, while occupied in their closets, with 
literary or scientific matters, act like children, 
if exposed to the aghations of public life. 

LIBERTY, 

As an abstract term, is opposed to necessity, 
and means the absence of restraint, or hin- 
drance, or interruption in the performance of an 
action, or the fulfilment of any desire. (See 
Necessity.) 

LOGIC, 

Considered as a science, explains the opera- 
tion of the mind in reasoning, or in discovering 
truth. As an art it teaches the method of 
managing the faculties of abstraction, generali- 
zation, and judgment, to the greatest advantage ; 
and gives rules also for detecting fallacious or 
sophistical arguments. Logic has, in modern 
times, been much neglected and despised, in 



116 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

consequence of the futile matter, or the un- 
meaning jargon, with which, formerly, it 
abounded. It is well that the ancient system 
of wrangling about trifles should be discarded ; 
but it is nevertheless true that the mind may be 
greatly strengthened and aided by that sort of 
training and exercise which is scarcely at all 
attempted in modern education. A man may 
be both strong and brave who is taken un- 
trained from the plough ; but neither his strength 
nor courage will be of much service in a field 
of battle, until he has learned to employ both 
with the precision, promptitude, and subordina- 
tion, which are taught by the military exercise. 
And thus too, good sense, and strength of mind, 
are often baffled or overthrown by the subtilty 
of a crafty reasoner, merely because the mind 
wants the training which a sound and rational 
system of logic might afiford. 



MAJOR, MINOR, aud MIDDLE TERMS 866 

SYLLOGISM. 

MATTER, 

That which occupies space, which, when so 
occupied, is called 6xtension. Matter becomes 
knov\/n to the mind by its obstructing the move- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 117 

merits of the body, and by its affecting at the 
same time the organ of sight. Having gained 
the knowledge of that which is sohd and visible, 
we think of it as a substance, which supports, 
or contains all the various qualities of color, 
figure, density, fragrance, taste, &c. that affect 
the senses. All we have knowledge of is either 
mind or matter. The former feels, and knows, 
and moves the latter ; the latter makes impres- 
sions on the senses, and resists the power of 
movement. 

MEMORY, 

Is the presence of some image or notion in 
the mind, attended by those accidental circum- 
stances which connect it with our past consci- 
ousness. It is this faculty of memory which 
maintains in the mind, from day to day, and 
from year to year, the conviction of personal 
identity, amid the greatest changes of disposi- 
tion, or external condition. And, by a tacit 
inference from this feeling of past and continuous 
existence, we learn to look forward to a remote 
futurity. The faculty of memory, in different 
minds, has various excellencies and defects. In 
some minds it is ready ; that is to say, it in- 
stantly brings forward the particular recollec- 
tions that are required by the occasion. In 



118 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

Others it is retentive of whatever has once been 
impressed on it ; but does not act so promptly, 
when called to produce its evidence. In others 
it receives with great facility new impressions; 
retains them in perfection for a short time but 
very quickly loses every trace of its acquisitions. 
The memxOry is perhaps more nearly, than any 
other faculty, connected with the state of the 
brain as a bodily organ : — it is most perfect in 
youth, and is the first of the mental powers to 
exhibit the effects of age : it is impaired, or 
sometimes entirely lost, in consequence of in- 
juries on the head ; and has been recovered 
when such injuries have been remedied. The 
memory also is susceptible of very great im- 
provement, by exercise ; and, on the contrary, 
becomes almost torpid, if neglected. The 
training and exercise of the memory should 
therefore be a principal business of education. 
There is however nothing which more enfeebles 
the reasoning powers, and checks the imagina- 
tion, than an excessive or exclusive exercise of 
the memory. 

METAPHYSICS. 

The knowledge of things actually existing, 
whether material or immaterial, is comprehended 
under the different branches of physical or na- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 119 

tiiral philosophy ; such as natural history, me- 
chanical philosophy, chemistry, &c. or pneuma- 
tology, which is the science of mind. But 
there are abstract or universal truths — principles 
which would be true whether or not the world 
and its inhabitants existed ; or if the world, and 
all it contains, were altogether unlike what it 
is. The knowledge of these unwersal truths, 
and their relation one to another, is taught by 
metaphysics. The pure mathematics, or higher 
principles of geometry and arithmetic, stand in 
the same relation to mechanical science, and to 
what is called the mixed mathematics, which 
exists between metaphysics and the philosophy 
of the human mind. As for example— the pro- 
portion between the diameter and circumference 
of a circle, which is nearly as 113 to 355, 
would be the same, though no material world 
existed, and is absolutely independent of all the 
laws and arrangements of the actual world. 
But such principles as the laws of gravitation, 
which regulate the movements of the planets, 
and the attractions and repulsions that exist 
among different bodies, and the refraction of 
light, are facts in the constitution of the ma- 
terial system, and are learned by observation 
and experiment. And thus, in like manner, 
those facts which have been mentioned under 



120 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

the articles Judgment, Memory, Imagination, 
belong to the real and actual constitution of the 
human mind ; which might have been otherwise 
framed than it is. But such truths as these — 
Every effect must have a Cause — There must 
be a First Cause — and a Self-existent Being, 
are abstract and unchangeable principles ; and 
belong to Metaphysics. 

METHOD, 

Is the arranging of our knowledge in that 
order which renders it most intelligible to others, 
whom we w^ish to instruct. It is a disposition, 
having in view a specific object. Methodical 
habits of thinking should not be mistaken for 
philosophical habits, in which there is more of 
analysis, and of generahzation, than of obvious 
arrangement. 

MIND, 

Is that which perceives, feels, remembers, 
acts, and is conscious of continued existence. 

MODE. 

The manner or conditions under which a 
thing exists, is called its mode : — figure and 
color are modes of matter. This term is merely 
logical, and of little utility. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 121 

NATURE. 

All the properties or qualities, taken together, 
which are deemed proper to a thing, or insepa- 
rable from it, constitute its nature or essence. 
The word nature is a mere term of conveni- 
ence, which briefly signifies all the ordinary 
or most important qualities of the thing w^e 
speak of. 

NECESSITY. 

As an abstract term, is opposed, 1st, to Con- 
tingency, which means either the happening of 
events without any cause why they should 
happen, and then necessity means only that 
every effect has a cause; or contingency means 
that there is no absurdity or contradiction in sup- 
posing that something which does exist, might 
not have existed ; as for example, some parti- 
cular species of animals ; for w^e can conceive 
very well of a world in wdiich there were no 
lions, or no elephants : — lions and elephants are, 
therefore, contingent, not necessary beings. Or, 
2dly, Necessity is often opposed to liberty ; but # 
an improper or unintelligible sense is assigned 
to the word, when so employed, unless it is 
merely intended to affirm, that no cause can 
operate beyond its sphere, or that no being can 



122 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

go beyond its powers and faculties ; — but then 
some such word as limitation is to be preferred. 
A stone necessarily remains where it hes, until 
it be moved bj some foreign cause. An animal 
necessarily pursues the instincts of its nature ; 
and a necessity of nature denies to man the 
liberty of soaring through the air. These forms 
of speaking add nothing to the clearness or 
precision of our notions ; and have arisen out 
of absurd disputations. Necessity, certainty, 
possibility, impossibihty, &c. are words (as they 
are familiarly used) which indicate only a higher 
or lower degree of knowledge of the hidden 
causes of things. One man regards a future 
event as contingent — probable — possible, which 
another pronounces to be necessary, certain, or 
impossible. As thus: — A bowing wall, or a 
tottering house, is looked at by two persons; 
one, if asked whether it will stand a year 
longer, rephes, " That it may stand so long, but 
its doing so is contingent, or probable, or im- 
probable." But the other, who is a builder, and 
who has examined the foundations and the 
fissures, and held his plumb-line to the up- 
rights, affirms, that the whole will fall to the 
ground in a few days ; — he says it will neces- 
sarily fall : that is to say — he who speaks knows 
the causes on which the event depends ; the 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 123 

Other is ignorant of them, and thought the 
event in question a chance. (See Contingency 
and Liberty.) 

NEGATIVE and POSITIVE, 

Are correlative terms, w^hen causes or qualities 
are spoken of. Beneficence is a positive virtue. 
Justice may, in a sense, be called a negative 
virtue ; for it may be defined as consisting in 
not invading the rights of others. Negative 
and affirmative are the correlative terms, if ap- 
plied to propositions. As — " Piety, with con- 
tentment, is great gain :" this is a positive pro- 
position. '' Riches w^ill not ensure happiness," 
is negative. 

NOMINAL and REAL, 

Are terms occurring in the history of intel- 
lectual philosophy, and refer to an absurd dispute, 
long carried on with great violence and rancor, 
on the question, whether general ideas, or essen- 
tial forms, have any real existence — no one can 
say where — as Plato imagined ; or whether 
they are nothing more than the notions formed 
in the human mind, after contemplating things, 
as genus and species. The adherents of the 
former opinion were called Reahsts, those of the 
latter Nominalists. 



124 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

NOTION. 

The word idea is most properly applied to 
images of tilings in the mind, retained or re- 
called ; while the word notion signifies complex 
abstractions of some kind, such as those of 
justice, truth, equality, disproportion, Sic. 

ORDER, 

Is a fixed succession of many things — which 
succession has reference to some intention, and 
is the consequence of arrangement. Or the 
word order is used more abstractedly, in rela- 
tion to number, spoken of, not in the aggregate, 
but as consisting of successive integers, the 
relative place of each being noted — as the 7th, 
8th, 9th. 

OPINION. 

Facts or principles which rest upon demon- 
stration are knoimi. Facts established by good 
and sufficient evidence, are believed. Abstract 
or speculative principles, confirmed by argu- 
ments which we deem conclusive or satisfac- 
tory, though they may not seem so to others, 
are matters of opinion. We hnoiv, or may 
know, that a square, raised upon a hypothenuse, 
is equal to the two squares together, that are 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 125 

raised upon the upright and base hne of a right- 
angled triangle. We believe that Brutus killed 
Caesar. It is our opinion, that a limited mon- 
archy is preferable to a democracy. The word 
opinion is most frequently applied to abstract 
propositions, which are matters of dispute, and 
which excite a lively interest, such, for example, 
as political or religious principles. 

The circumstances of education, habit, and 
interest, or association ; or even the tastes and 
inclinations that belong to the imagination, have, 
with most men, more influence in the determi- 
nation of their opinions, than the mere argu- 
ments that support such principles. - It is to be 
remembered, that in questions which do not 
admit of demonstrative reasoning, or on which 
the evidence is not of the most obvious and 
irresistible kind, there is always room for the 
establishment of a contrary supposition ; so that 
even tiie most improbable opinion, if viewed 
exclusively in the light of those few evidences 
which give it an appearance of truth, may seem 
reasonable. And if the mind has acquired the 
habit of timidly, or resentfully, or perversely 
turning away from all evidence but that which 
favors its prejudices, or interests, its pride, or its 
indolence, it may hold or defend an error of 
opinion, without direct insincerity, or conscious 



126 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

dishonesty. And after a while, the inconclu- 
sive evidence, which at first perhaps by no means 
satisfied the understanding, has made itself so 
famiUar,-so intelligible, and has assumed so fair 
an aspect, and has insensibly drawn to itself so 
many little corroborations, that all doubt and 
suspicion is for ever dismissed ; and the mind 
becomes absolutely enslaved by its own delu- 
sions. 

Though the majority of mankind adhere, 
through life, to the opinions they may have 
adopted from education, or interest ; instances 
of a change of opinion are not uncommon. 
Such changes take place from various causes. 
Some men are very often veering from point to 
point, in consequence of instability of disposition. 
There is a feeble activity — an irresolute force, 
in the mind, which at once prevents its attain- 
ing complete conviction on any disputed matter, 
and tempts it to wander, hither and thither, in 
search of what it can never find — undoubted 
certainty. A melancholic timidity also, breeds, 
in some minds, a distrust of all evidence : — 
persons of this temper change their opinions, 
again and again, from the mere fear of having 
been deceived in those they last held. There is 
also an affectation of independence and freedom 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 127 

from vulgar prejadice, which impels some per- 
sons frequently to profess a new creed. 

There are those who abandon the principles 
of their education from the influence of a strong 
pecuharitj of temper. — The accident of birth 
has perhaps placed them in an atmosphere 
which they cannot breathe, and when the in- 
tellectual powers expand, they betake themselves 
to what they feel a more congenial region. He 
whose temper is at once arrogant and timid, 
will probably go over to the party which pro- 
fesses arbitrary principles of government; he 
will abhor republicanism ; rail at the defenders 
of popular rights : and court the favor of the 
noble : — he will have little sympathy with the 
poor, and the many ; while he approves of the 
force, and apologizes for the corruption, by 
which the privileges of the feiv are supported. 
On the other hand, he whose pride and arro- 
gance are of a more active and malignant kind, 
will be the friend of the populace, and the foe 
of the great and noble ; — he will profess opinions 
which give a show of reason to a turbulent 
hostility towards those who administer the go- 
vernment, let their measures be what they may. 
The spirit of contradiction, and the love of 
wrangling, is the ruling principle in some minds ; 
and persons affected by it may be driven, by 



128 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

opposition, into the profession of any opinion, 
how absurd soever, or contrary to their former 
professions. In order to secure themselves as 
far as possible against the danger of finding no 
opponents, they declare themselves the kdvo- 
cates of whatever is most paradoxical and fla- 
grantly extravagant. 

But although the profession of this or of that 
new order of opinions is too often the result of 
improper motives, there are not wanting in- 
stances of the renunciation of one set of prin- 
ciples, and the adoption of. another, in conse- 
quence of an ingenuous attention to evidence 
and argument. Such revolutions, especially 
when religion is the subject of them, and when 
they spring from genuine motives, will be at- 
tended with modesty, and with a respectful and 
kind treatment of thpse who may still adhere 
to the principles that have been renounced. A 
noisy and insolent dogmatism distinguishes, not 
only blind and obstinate pertinacity, but versa- 
tility also ; and he who to-day turns round 
offensively upon the party to which yesterday 
he belonged, may be expected to-morrow to 
make some new movement, that shall compel 
him to criminate his own most recent profes- 
sions. 

The great principle — so little thought of, 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 129 

though so obvious that the statement of it seems 
unnecessary — That notliing but Truth can in 
the end be advantageous or safe, would, if al- 
ways kept in sight, secure us from a thousand 
influences which lead us into error. 



PASSIVE — see active. 



PERCEPTION, 

Is distinguished from sensation and conception. 
The mere impression produced upon the mind 
through the senses by external objects, is called 
a sensation : and if this impression were un- 
connected with others, belonging to different 
senses, we should perhaps not be led to regard 
it as caused by an external object. Thus, 
for example, a taste or smell, or the prick of a 
pin, alone, would be regarded merely as di feeling 
of the mind. But when that which is tasted is 
at the same Uxnefelt, and has just before been 
seen, we involuntarily combine the several sen- 
sations ; or think of them as derived from one 
and the same source. And it is thus, especially, 
that when we see and touch an object, the 
two very dissimilar sensations, combined, give 



130 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

the conviction of an external object, as the one 
cause of both. Conception is the recovery of 
some past perception. 

PHENOMENON, 

From (pajvo>Hvov — something which makes its 
appearance. This term of physical science is 
most properly applied to the visible objects of 
natm*al philosophy, and especially to facts or ap- 
pearances which have not yet been fully ex- 
plained. Fhenomena are invitations addressed 
by nature to the rational curiosity of man. 

POWER— see CAUSE. 

Having derived the notion signified by the 
word poiver, from our own conscious abiUty, 
both to affect or move matter, and to control 
our own thoughts, we impute it to whatever is 
seen, or to whatever seems to produce a change 
upon another body ; and thus learn to speak of 
the powers of nature : — but when these powers 
are closely examined we find nothing beyond 
the fact, that a certain event invariably and im- 
mediately follows another ; as that if fire be 
applied to lead — the solid becomes a fluid. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 131 

PREDICATE, 

Is that which is affirmed or denied, in a 
proposition, concerning its subject : as that — 
Etna is — a volcanic mountain : or, Etna has 
not lately vomited fire, 

PREJUDICE. 

An opinion adopted or maintained, without 
proper regard to the evidence on which it rests, 
and especially if it be adhered to under the in- 
fluence of improper motives, is called a 'pre- 
judice, whether or not that opinion be in itself 
well founded. Two persons may believe the 
same thing, or hold the same opinion, the one 
from rational conviction, the other from preju- 
•dice. Prejudices may be classed, according to 
the quality of motives from which they spring. 
Of these motives, some are of a pleasurable, or 
comparatively innocent, or social kind ; while 
others are mahgnant and pernicious. Among 
prejudices of the first class may be mentioned 
— Those springing from personal vanity. — 
When our own endowments, or qualifications, 
or acquirements, or external advantages, are 
placed in comparison with those of others, the 
emotion of self-love so much disturbs the judg- 
ment, that we are in great danger of falling into 



132 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

egregious errors of estimation, and often believe 
those virtues or talents to be splendid, which in 
truth are only of an ordinary kind. There are 
prejudices of the heart which are rather weak- 
nesses than vices. Thus the fondness of parents 
for their children leads them often to overrate 
their good qualities, and to be blind to their 
faults. What is called the love of country, or 
the warm preference of the land of our birth 
to all others, usually brings with it some false 
judgments, which cannot be deemed better than 
prejudices. There are prejudices of a more 
indefinite nature, though perhaps they may be 
traced to some modification of self-love. Such 
are the capricious and fond preferences which 
weak minds exhibit towards things, persons, or 
pursuits, they have accidentally become attached 
to. And such is that eager fondness for, and 
exclusive attention to, frivolous or comparatively 
unimportant amusements, in matters of science 
or literature, which fill some men's days with 
laborious idleness. So strong are prejudices of 
this order, in some cases, that the attainment of 
a rare coin, or shell, or insect, or plant, for com- 
pleting a collection, or the purchase of a scarce 
book, shall entirely engross the mind, and ap- 
pear a matter of more grave importance than 
the most momentous affairs of real Hfe ! Of 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 



133 



such pursuits it may be said, that though they 
seem innocent, they are not so, if they with- 
draw the mind from the offices of charity and 
philanthropy ; or render a man useless in the 
world, abounding as it does with miseries that 
might be alleviated by zeal and kindness. 
Prejudices springing from malignant motives 
have already been referred to (see Opinion) : 
they are always both injurious and odious :— 
such are those which arise from the pride of 
rank, wealth, or learning ; — from capricious an- 
tipathies against individuals ; — from personal 
jealousies, or opposition of interests ; — from 
party spirit, in matters of religion, or politics ; — 
or from national, provincial, or corporate ani- 
mosities. There may indeed be something 
amiable in the prejudice which impels a man 
to think that the cHmate, and the produce, and 
the institutions of his native land are the best 
in the world ; though in fact they may be 
among the worst. But the prejudice which 
leads an Enghshman to hate, or to hold in con- 
tempt, an American or a German, is altogether 
vicious. 

Candor may be defined as a wilhngness to 
revise or examine our opinions, on subjects in 
reference to which we are exposed to the influ- 
ence of some improper motive, and hkely, there- 



134 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

fore, to entertain a prejudice. False candor is 
— a prejudice, against prejudice. That is to 
say, it is such a feeble and foohsh jealousy of 
being influenced by prejudices, as prevents our 
making a decided choice between truth and 
error. 

PREMISES, 

Things laid down, or affirmed as known, or 
granted, from which some conclusion is to be 
derived: — as thus, ]st. If all men, without re- 
straint, pursue their private advantage, there 
can be no security of life or property to any. 
2d, But if there be no security to life or pro- 
perty, there will be no industry. 3d, And 
if there be no industry, men must remain 
in a savage state. 4th, Therefore some 
form of government, which shall have the 
power to restrain the cupidity or ferocity of 
individuals, is necessary to civilization. In this 
argument the three first propositions are the 
premises, and are assumed as facts, or principles 
that will not be denied ; the 4th proposition is 
the conclusion, which must be granted, because 
of its evident connexion with the premises. 

PRIMARY and SECONDARY QUALITIES 

Are distinguished on the supposition that 
certain properties are inseparable from a sub- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 135 

Stance ; or that the want of any one of them 
would destroy its essence; while other qualities 
may be thought of as present, or absent, without 
affecting the nature of the thing. — Thus exten- 
sion and solidity are called primary qualities of 
matter : — color, flavor, fragrancy, are secondary. 
These distinctions are of little importance. 

PRINCIPLE, 

From principium, a beginning. The ele- 
ments, or the most important qualities, or parts 
of a substance, are called its principles ; whence 
its other properties take their rise. The princi- 
ples of a science, are those axioms, or great 
facts, which, though not always first discovered, 
are first to be learned, and which, when under- 
stood, lead the way to the comprehension of all 
the branches of a science. 

PROBABILITY. 

This word, though a higher sense is often 
attached to it, represents only the extent of our 
ignorance, either of the causes which will in- 
fluence some future event, or of the actual facts 
of some past event, affirmed or surmised to 
have taken place. Our ignorance leads us to 
think of facts as being in themselves, more or 



136 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

less certain : but this is a mere prejudice of the 
understanding. Historical affirmations are 
either true or false, absolutely : yet, when not 
incontestably established, it is usual to speak of 
them in some such terms as these. — We say, 
for example — It is probable that the temple of 
Belus was founded on the site of the tower of 
Babel. — It is highly probable that Plato had 
perused some parts of the Hebrew Scriptures. 
— There is a slight probability in the conjec- 
ture that the Egyptian pyramids were built by 
the enslaved Israelites. — It is in the highest de- 
gree probable, that the planets are inhabited. 
Or w^e speak of events now occurring at a dis- 
tance, in a similar manner ; and say — It is 
probable that my friend has already left his home, 
and is on his way to pay me a visit. — Or of 
future events in the same terms — It is probable 
that a communication may one day be opened 
through the Isthmus of Suez, between the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. Now 
all these propositions, whether they relate to 
the past or the future, are absolutely true, or 
absolutely false. — Degrees of probabiHty belong 
altogether to the degree, or extent, of our know- 
ledge of the facts (in past events) or of the 
causes that are to influence what is yet future. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 137 

PROPOSITION, 

The affirming or denying of one thing, con- 
cerning another — Every complete sentence is 
a proposition, directly or obliquely declaring 
some truth ; and every such sentence contains 
— 1st, A subject ; — or that concerning which 
an affirmation is advanced : 2d, A predicate, or 
truth affirmed ; and 3d, A form of connexion 
between the two, called a copxla : as thus. — 
(The sun) (is) (risen). Or, The people of 
India (the subject) are (the cojmla) divided into 
castes (the predicate). An argument, or chain 
of reasoning, consists of a series of propositions, 
each of which, after the first, is true, because, 
the one which precedes it is true. Every pre- 
ceding proposition in an argument, contains, 
or is alleged to contain, its successor. 

REASON 

Has already been distinguished from Instinct. 
It is distinguished from the other faculties of the 
mind by its relating always to knowledge, and 
consisting in the action of the mind upon its 
knowledge ; either separating its ideas, or 
notions, one from another; or comparing or 
combining them. If the mind constantly 
obeyed external impulses, or invariably yielded 



138 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

itself to the current of its ideas, it would not 
deserve to be called — an intelligence, or a ra- 
tional nature. Its power over itself, a power 
directed bj knowledge, and employed for the 
accomplishment of some purpose foreseen, is 
what constitutes Reason. 



REASONING, 

In the acquired sense of the word, is not 
any employment of Reason ; but that particular 
employment which has for its object the dis- 
covery of truth, by tracing the connexion of one 
admitted fact with another, through a longer or 
a shorter series of propositions. In a sound 
argument, that is to say, in conclusive reasoning, 
the predicate of each proposition must be true 
of its subject ; and the connexion between the 
successive propositions must be truly stated. 
If this be the case, then the last proposition, 
for the sake of establishing which the process 
has been passed through, may be assented to as 
certain. Such processes of reasoning become 
necessary only on account of the limitation of 
the human mind, which does not admit more 
than a very few facts to be contemplated at 
once. The more vigorous and comprehensive 
any mind is, the less need it has of reasoning, 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 139 

to reach a distant conclusion. On the contrary, 
a feeble and contracted mind must, as it were, 
creep from point to point, of an argument ; and 
when it has reached the termination, it has per- 
haps lost its hold of the connexion of facts, and is 
rather so much the more perplexed, than con- 
vinced, by its own effort to attain the desired 
conclusion. But much facility may be acquired 
in reasoning, by exercise ; and this sort of ex- 
ercise ought to form a capital part of every good 
education. 

The real nature of the operation which is 
passed through, in a process of reasoning, may 
be exhibited by dissecting, if we may so speak, 
the working of an easy arithmetical problem. — 
I affirm, for instance, that if you take 432, nine 
times over, you will have 3888. — This is my 
ultimate proposition, which I assume as true, 
and profess to be able to establish.^ I do so, by 
presenting to you a number of lesser proposi- 
tions, the truth of which you have either already 
ascertained, or which you can perceive to be true, 
as soon as presented to you : and then, when 
all these propositions are taken together, or 
summed up in succession ; — that is to say, when 
the connexion between all of them is exhibited, 
you cannot refuse your assent to my conclusion. 
— As thus, — The figures 432 represent, in a 



140 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

condensed form, three distinct quantities ; 
namely, four hundred, and thirty, and two. We 
will therefore separately take each of these 
quantities nine times, and then join the several 
products : — 2, nine times taken, is 18 : and 30, 
nine times, is 270 : — but 270, and 18, are 288. 
Again ; 400, nine times taken, is 3600 ; and 
3600, added to 288, is 3888 ; which was at first 
affirmed. Now, if any one were not convinced 
of the truth of this affirmation, as thus proved, 
it would be necessary, in the first place, to dis- 
sect each of the above-named propositions fur- 
ther ; that is, to reduce each one to several 
smaller propositions, the truth of which might 
be more readily perceived ; — as for instance, we 
should show how 2, nine times, makes 18, &c. 
And after this more minute dissection had been 
gone through, we should explain the general 
principle of the argument ; by proving that all 
the parts of a thing, taken together, must be 
reckoned equal to the vi^hole of it ; and that 
therefore the summing up of all the propositions, 
must give a true result. It is often necessary, 
after a particular argument has been brought to 
a conclusion, to go back, in this manner, to a 
more general argument; for the purpose of jus- 
tifying the mode of conducting it. 

But whatever may be the subject of reason- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 141 

ing, or whatever the for7n it is made to assume, 
it is always, in substance, the same, namely — a 
showing, in succession, all the parts of a com- 
plex proposition, and all the connexions of those 
parts. It is obvious to remark, that an immea- 
surable advantage rests on the side of vigorous 
and practised minds, over the feeble and un- 
taught : — for the very necessity of examining, 
one by one, all the minute parts of a proposi- 
tion, adds so much to the labor of the mind, 
and so much increases the apparent confusion, 
that the weaker understanding is almost, or quite, 
as much embarrassed as aided by the endeavor 
to attain satisfaction. Meanwhile, the strong 
and well-taught mind, which has discerned the 
truth of the proposition in two or three large 
masses, if we might so speak, and has not de- 
scended to the lesser particulars, suffers no 
fatigue, is conscious of no confusion : but con- 
templates, at leisure, what has exhausted all the 
powers of the other to reach. Hence we may 
infer the serious responsibility which rests upon 
superior minds, in dealing with the simple and 
uninformed. — How careful should such be not 
to abuse the advantage they possess ; — an ad- 
vantage which there are always so many temp- 
tations to abuse ! It would be thought a poor 
triumph for an adult to exhibit his strength in 



142 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

crushing an infant. And is it not a paltry 
triumph which men of intellectual acuteness 
obtain, when they employ their powers of rea- 
soning to mislead and confound the uninformed 
by specious sophisms l 

RELATION. 

That which gives rise to a comparison be- 
tween two things, and which leads us hence- 
forward to think of each, not as if alone, but 
as if connected with the other, though in truth 
there is no other connexion than what has been 
formed in our own minds. Tf we think of a 
house as high, it is because we have (mentally 
at least) compared it with one not so high. — 
There exists in our mind a relation of ine- 
quahty between the two houses. If we see 
these two lines, 



we can hardly avoid comparing them, ^rst, in 
regard to their length ; and we perceive them 
to be equal : or, in other words, they are related 
to each other by their equality in length. We 
then think of their 'position, one to the other ; 
and perceiving that they are equally distant, 
from end to end, we say they are parallel Hnes. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 143 

— Now this word 'parallel represents nothing 
that actually exists, or that can be shown in 
either of the lines ; but it declares the notion 
the mind has formed of their relation, one to 
the other, of equal distance, at all points. 

A very large proportion of all our abstract 
notions are relations : — that is^ the result of some 
comparison between two things, or notions ; as 
for example. — Truth is a relation of sameness, 
or agreement, between an affirmation, and the 
thing spoken of. Value, or w^orth, is a relation 
of equality, between one mode of employing or 
consuming a commodity, and another mode. 
In analysing relative notions, we have first to 
ascertain what the two things are which are 
supposed to be compared ; and then, what is 
the proportion which the one bears to the other. 

SENSATION— see PERCEPTION. 

Is the mere effect produced upon the mind, 
through the senses, by some external object. 
The construction of the organs of sensation — 
the eye — the ear — the palate, &c. may, to a 
certain extent, be understood, and laid open ; 
and again we may examine our consciousness, 
and distinguish one kind of sensation from 
another ; but we are utterly ignorant of the 



144 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

reason of the connexion between the falUng of 
light upon the retina of the eje, and the sensa- 
tion produced on the mind thereby. It is, how- 
ever, certain, that it is the mind, not the body, 
which feels and perceives ; and it may well be 
imagined that the organs of sensation are, in 
fact, limitations of .the sensitiveness of the mind ; 
or are the means of the confinement of its uni- 
versal faculty of seeing, hearing, tasting, &c. to 
a particular spot or portion of the nervous sys- 
tem. It may be conceived, that if the nerves 
of the hand, for instance, were exposed to the 
impression of light, in the same degree as 
they are upon the retina, that we should see 
there, as well as in the eye ; — and the same of 
the other senses. We may then imagine that 
the mind, if separated entirely from the body, 
or set free from all hmitation, would, by its 
proper and uniform sensibility, perceive inces- 
santly all external objects. This supposition is 
at least as probable as that the being which, in 
the body, perceives, should lose its sensibility 
when separated from it. Nor is it improbable 
that the dissolution of the body may set the 
spirit free to perceive some ne\D qualities of the 
external world. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 145 

SIGNS, 

Are not resemblances, or images of things, 
but sounds or marks, associated by inere usage 
in the mind, with certain ideas or notions. 
This use of arbitrary signs, connected as it is 
with the power of giving modulations to the 
voice, and subserving, as it does, the faculty of 
abstraction, not only affords the means of inter- 
course between man and man ; but is the great 
instrument of all intellectual operations, and the 
principal means of all improvement. — The use 
of signs may be taken as the distinguishing 
difference between man and the inferior tribes. 
Whether it be possible to think or reason at all 
concerning abstract notions without the use of 
words, may be questioned ; but it is certain that 
words facilitate, and abbreviate, and^:r the pro- 
cesses of thought in an incalculable degree. 
This must be allowed, although it were granted, 
on the other hand, that words are a very im- 
perfect instrument of mental operations, and that 
they convey abstract notions, and mental facts, 
very vaguely, and often erroneously. 

Let any one attempt to think without a 
mental reference to words, and he will find how 
much (though unconsciously) he is ordinarily 
indebted to them. 



146 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

If there had been but one language in the 
world, and that language permanent from age 
to age, it would have been very difficult, per- 
haps impossible, not to have supposed that there 
is a real connexion between certain sounds, and 
the things of which they are the signs. But 
the diversity of languages enables us readily to 
perceive that all signs are purely arbitrary, and 
that man means man, only by usage ; for after 
crossing a channel or a river, we find that 
homm,e means man ; — or ho?no ; or av^pwrro^. 
The diversity of language though attended 
with many inconveniences, has uuquestionably 
operated to set the human mind free from what 
would otherwise, probably, have been a sort of 
despotism of words over ideas, and notions, and 
opinions. This diversity has, without depriving 
us of the usefulness of language, as an instru- 
ment of thought, enabled us to use it freely, and 
independently — as a mere instrument, and no- 
thing more. 

SOPHISM, 

From (fm(fixa, a device, or fraudulent contriv- 
ance. Though any sort of false and specious 
argument is sometimes called a sophis7n, the 
epithet is most properly applied to those falla- 
cious reasonings which are constructed for the 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 147 

purpose of recommending error ; and which he 
who employs them strives to shield from ex- 
amination, by subtilty, and the ambiguity of 
language. In books of logic are to be found 
methodical descriptions of the various sorts of 
sophisms, together with rules, which may fur- 
nish aid in detecting the lurking error of all 
such fallacious arguments. But, however good 
these rules may be, it requires much attention, 
and some acuteness, as well as frequent exercise 
in disputation, to make any practical use of 
them, or to retain in the memory the abstract 
distinctions on which they are founded. In- 
stead of attempting, in this place, to give a 
summary of any such rules, two or three plain 
directions and hints are offered, which may 
serve to secure the mind against the danger of 
having important principles overthrown by the 
craft of disingenuous wranglers. 

1st. A sophistical argument is very commonly 
expressed in a style of affected nicety, and of 
refined precision. The sophist will seldom 
consent to state his reasons in any other terms 
than those he has artfully selected. But sub- 
stantial and important truths, as they are always 
independent of words, may be conveyed, with 
nearly equal advantage, in several forms of ex- 
pression ; and an honest reasoner, if indeed he 
understands what he advances, will, if he fails 



148 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

to make himself intelligible in one mode, readily 
find another, and yet another set of phrases, 
until his proposition, whether true or false, 
stands out fairly in the hght. Whoever sus- 
pects that an argument which he finds it diffi- 
cult to overthrow, is sophistical, may well 
demand that it should be presented to him 
in another form of expression ; and that no 
stress should be laid upon certain words ; 
especially if they are of an abstruse or ambi- 
guous kind. 

2d. Sophistical reasoning, if not subtile and 
nice, is often bold, abrupt, and dogmatical, and 
affects to force assent, by the power of demon- 
stration ; and that too on subjects which do 
not admit of demonstrative reasoning. 

Now, as a defence against this sort of vio- 
lence, or tyranny, it should be borne in mind, 
especially when questions are discussed which 
have long been matters of controversy, that if 
these pretended demonstrations were indeed 
sound and good— -if they were as conclusive as 
they may seem to be, to those to whom they 
are new, they would long ago have brought 
the controversv to a conclusion, and have com- 
pelled the assent at least of all intelligent and 
honest men. Demonstrative reasoning, either 
supersedes all other arguments ; or it is utterly 
useless. It is good for every thing, or good for 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 149 

nothing. Of this sort, for example, is the brief 
method which has often been resorted to for 
the pm-pose of disproving the Christian miracles. 
— All our knowledge, it is said, is drawn from 
experience : — we must therefore always be 
guided by our experience, in what we believe, 
or disbeheve. Now^ it is contrary to our expe- 
rience that the dead should return to life, or 
that cripples should be made to walk, by a word. 
But on the contrary, it is agreeable to experi- 
ence that men should invent and propagate 
marvellous tales. — Therefore, it is reasonable to 
suppose the narratives of the Evangelists to be 
fabrications. If this demonstration were a 
sound one, it would not only destroy our belief 
in Christianity, but put an end to all science, 
and give the lie to the greater part of history ; 
for it would make it unreasonable to beheve 
any thing of which we had not some personal 
knowledge. As when a native of northern 
climates declares, to the inhabitants of some 
tropical island, that, in his country, water is 
often as hard as a stone. According to the 
above mentioned sophism, the islanders would 
do well to treat such an account with scorn ; 
for it contradicts their experience, and is far less 
credible than that travellers should relate iic- 



150 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

tions. But we see that such a rule would be 
fallacious. 

3d. When sophistical reasoning is neither 
subtile nor dogmatical, it is often flippant and 
epigrammatic. This style is adopted by those 
who, being incapable of thinking vigorously, 
employ jests and irony to disguise the poverty 
of their understandings; — or, who having adopt- 
ed profligate principles, which they well know 
will not bear examination, have recourse to wit, 
as the best weapon for keeping off the attacks 
of sound reason. By far the greater part of all 
that has been written against the Bible, is 
sophistry of this sort. 

4th. The real question at issue is often co- 
vertly taken for granted, in a sophistical argu- 
ment ; or is silently assumed, as a general prin- 
ciple, which no one disputes. A whimsical 
instance of this sort is the one which has fre- 
quently been related of the witty Charles II. 
who proposed it as a grave question — Why a 
pail of water weighed no more after a fish was 
put into it than before \ After much learned 
controversy had taken place on the subject, the 
difficulty was dispelled by simply denying the 
assumed fact. An easy means of exposing 
many sophisms, is to examine, one by one, the 
propositions which are tacitly or obliquely 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 151 

affirmed in the argument A single word some- 
times contains within it the very point in dis- 
pute, by having a double, or doubtful sense. 
Thus it may be said — a virtuous man need not 
trouble himself with matters of faith, or forms 
of piety ; for virtue must ever be the object of 
the Divine favor ; and those who possess it can 
have nothing to fear in the future life. The 
questionable point is here indirectly affirmed, 
by calling a man virtuous^ who is destitute of 
faith and piety ; or whose only virtue consists 
in temperance and honesty. — We may deny 
this to be virtue, and then the sophism is stript 
of all appearance of force. 

5th. Sophisms often consist in assigning the 
wrong cause of an effect, when two causes 
have become accidentally associated. As when 
it is affirmed that Christianity has been the 
cause of massacres, persecutions, and sangui- 
nary wars. It is true that the name of Chris- 
tianity, and its authority, have been used as a 
pretext to justify the ambition and cupidity of 
princes, or their advisers : but it is these malig- 
nant passions, not the Gospel of peace, which 
have been the scourges of mankind. 

6th. Sophisms consist sometimes in the use 
of a general principle, as if it were universal. 
It is perhaps generally true, or true to some ex- 



152 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

tent, that Portuguese are perfidious, Spaniards 
proud, Italians revengeful, &c., but it is far from 
universally true, and nothing can be more illi- 
beral than to assume the truth of such proposi- 
tions, ill particular instances, without proof. 
Persons who attempt to decide practical ques- 
tions by vulgar maxims, are often in the wrong 
on this ground. There is, perhaps, some ge- 
neral truth contained in certain popular apo- 
thegms ; but nothing that can be confided in, 
as a rule. Or the exceptions are quite as many 
as the instances in point It may be observed 
that persons of cultivated minds and of exten- 
sive experience, sometimes err by placing too 
little reliance upon general rules, which they 
know to be open to many exceptions ; while 
on the contrary, uncultivated minds make a 
rude and blind use of such rules, without allow- 
ing at all for exceptions. 

It should ever be kept in mind, that the 
soundness of an argument is not to be esti- 
mated by our personal ability to defend, or to 
expose it. We may be much embarrassed, or 
quite overthrown in our endeavors to establish 
the principles we believe to be true : and may 
be utterly at a loss to reply to the objections of 
those who impugn them. But it by no means 
follows that those principles are erroneous, or 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 153 

those objections valid. All the difficulty may 
arise from our particular ignorance, or want of 
address, in argumentation. There is no de- 
fence against sophistry better than an intelli- 
gent modesty. Indeed, a true firmness of mind 
implies an habitual recollection of the limited 
extent of our powers and acquirements ; and 
there is a union of diffidence and of courage 
which true wisdom approves : — that is to say — 
diffidence of ourselves, and courage in resist- 
ing the attempts of others to strip us, in a mo- 
ment, of our principles. It rarely happens that 
important truths are acquired in consequence 
of disputation. To read — to think — to con- 
verse calmly with the best informed persons ; 
and, if the matters in question belong to reli- 
gion — to implore Divine teaching — these are 
methods of learning far more likely to lead us 
to truth, than to wrangle with wranglers. So- 
phistry is the common fruit of disputation ; and 
even when our cause is good we are in danger 
of faUing into disingenuous methods of argu- 
ment, if hardly pressed by an adversarv, or if 
the temper be roused by a sense of unfairness 
on his side. Simple truth then not serving our 
purpose, we turn to any subterfuge that may 
offer itself at the moment. 



154 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

SPACE. 

By the diffusion of sensation through the 
body, and by combining the sensations of touch 
and of sight, we acquire the notion of Exten- 
sion : if from this notion, which is conjoined 
with that of sohdity, or resistance, we detach, 
or abstract, the ideas of visible and tangible 
substance, the notion that remains is signified 
by the word B])ace. 

SUBJECT, 

In a proposition, is that, concerning which 
the predicate is affirmed, or denied. Or when 
speaking of things, it is that to which some 
quahty that has been mentioned is supposed to 
belong. 

SUBSTANCE : 

A mere word of convenience, representing 
the involuntary notion that is formed of a some- 
thing hidden, which supports, or sustains all the 
qualities by which any thing is made known to 
us. Or it may represent, abstractedly, the most 
inseparable and permanent of those quahties. 
Matter is called a solid, extended, and colored 
substance : Mind — a thinking, or rational 
substa?ice. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 155 

SUCCESSION OF IDEAS, 

Is that incessant flow, or continuous move- 
ment of images, feelings, notions, which belongs 
to the mind, both waking and sleeping, and 
which is again and again diverted, interrupted, 
and controlled, hy impressions on the senses — 
by internal sensations ; or by the exertion of 
the active power of the mind. There are cer- 
tain principles which seem to influence this 
flow of ideas, and these are called the laws of 

ASSOCIATION, or 

SUGGESTION ; 

That is to say, whatever it is that connects 
one involuntary thought with another ; or causes 
this image to follow that. Any one who re- 
traces the musings which have occupied him 
in an idle hour, will find that the most incon- 
gruous or dissimilar ideas have succeeded each 
other : and yet, if he can distinctly recollect the 
train of images, or feelings, he will discover, in 
each instance, some trivial or incidental circum- 
stance which has served to hnk them together. 
Some circumstance of resemblance, or of dis- 
similarity ; — of proximity in space, or time : — 
some jingle or rhythm of words ; — or some 



156 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

unison of the emotions which attended both 
ideas. 

This principle of suggestion prevails to a 
great extent, even w^hen the mind is in an active 
state : — or there is, if we might so speak, an 
alternate regency of the mind, by its involun- 
tary suggestions and its active power ; and in 
the issue of our meditations, there is commonly 
a mingling of both. Infirm minds are more 
controlled by suggestion, and less by voluntary 
power. Strong and cultured minds are less 
influenced by suggestion, and more by their 
rational force. The diversities of intellectual 
character take their rise very much from the 
differences that exist in this principle of sugges- 
tion. One man's thoughts are chiefly suggested 
by words, phrases, and modes of expression, 
that have fixed themselves in the liiemory ; 
such a one may speak fluently, and perti- 
nently, but will seldom or never be profound, 
or original. Another man's thoughts are 
suggested chiefly by his habitual emotions, or 
by what might be called — the color of his 
imagination. — Sentiments of benevolence, or 
anger, or contempt; or the love of freedom, 
or the emotions of piety ;— or impressions 
of sublimity, or ideas of beauty, rule the 
current of his thoughts, and enable him, 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 157 

with vivacity and force, to bring forv^^ard such as 
are most proper for exciting similar emotions in 
other men. But then he v^ill be dependent, for 
his pov^er of speaking effectively, upon the de- 
gree of excitement his mind may happen to be 
under. In another mind perhaps, external re- 
semblances, or casual analogies, are the ruling 
principles of suggestion ; and such will be in- 
genious, striking, witty, and seeminghj original, 
in their discourse. But if it be the real analo- 
gies, and abstract qualities of things, that form 
the principles of suggestion, they will constitute 
the philosophical character. When, from a 
man's ordinary or careless conversation, the 
particular law of suggestion in his mind is dis- 
covered, we may, as if by the use of a key, un- 
derstand much of his conduct, and often unravel 
his character ; and sometimes even anticipate 
what, in certain circumstances, he will say and 
do. A true knowledge of the law of suggestion, 
in our own minds, if kept in view, will often 
guard us against the follies or evils into which 
we are most prone to fall. 

SYLLOGISM, 

From tfuXXo/.tffxo?, a putting together of reasons. 
An inference from admitted principles, or 'pre- 



158 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

mises (as they are called) when expressed in 
due form, is called a syllogism ; as thus — 

1. No one who lives in perpetual fear can be 
happy ; 

2. But a miser lives in perpetual fear : 

3. Therefore a miser cannot be happy. 

If we know concerning the ivliole of a thing 
that it is so and so ; or not so ; we may then 
safely affirm the same of any part, as thus — 

All the space between the hues A, B, C, is 
green — 

But the Uttle space d, is included within the 
hues A, B, C ; 

Therefore the little space d, is green. 

All the artificial forms of the syllogism, as set 
forth in books of logic, may be reduced (in one 
manner or another) to this rule ; and, for all 
practical purposes, it is quite as well to drop the 
form of logical inference, and simply to state 
the inference, with an allusion to the general 
truth, whence it results as thus — A miser can 
never be happy because he lives in perpetual 
alarm. Every one well knows that this state 
of incessant trepidation is incompatible with 
happiness ; nothing is gained by formally de- 
claring it. 

In the technical language of logic, the two 
preceding propositions are called the preinises ; 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 159 

or the antecedents : and the first of them the 
major, the second the minor, and the third the 
conclusion. This method of formal reasoning 
bj syllogism, was long believed to be adapted to 
the discovery of things unknown. But it is 
manifest that it can safely be applied only to the 
setting for til, distinctly, of things already known. 
If the major proposition be uncertain, or if it 
contains more than we are fully acquainted 
with ; or if it be uncertain whether the minor 
be properly a part of the major, then our con- 
clusion must be also uncertain ; and if owing 
to this appearance of rigid reasoning, we are in- 
duced to think that to be ascertained, which in 
fact is not so, our logic serves only to fortify us 
in error. It was thus that during many ages, 
the most egregious errors in religion and philo- 
sophy,, were held to be unquestionable truths. 

SYNTHESIS, 

From duvkdi^, a putting together, is opposed 
to Analysis, which is the separation of parts, or 
elements. Analysis is employed on things un- 
knoivn, for the purpose of becoming acquainted 
with them. Synthesis is employed on things 
already known by analysis, and which are re- 
compounded for the purpose of contemplating 



160 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

them in their symmetry, and their mutual 
relations. 

TERMS 

Of a proposition, are its two ends, namely the 
subject, and the predicate. 

TESTIMONY, 

Is the conveyance of facts, by speaking or 
writing, from those who have personal knoivledge 
of them, to those who have not : the accepting 
of such evidence is Belief. (See Belief and 
Evidence ) By far the larger portion of all 
the evidence by which we are directed in the 
affairs of common life, and almost the entire 
mass of the sciences, and of what is called 
Learning, in its various branches, is received 
upon the faith of testimony. And in truth the 
human mind is so constituted as to receive, and 
to rely upon this sort of knowledge, with as 
much confidence as upon that which it acquires 
by personal inspection. It is only after having 
found it, in several instances, fallacious, that we 
learn to withhold our confidence, or to ask for 
corroborative evidence. 

Testimony may be fallacious, either in con- 
sequence of the unintentional error of the wit- 
ness ; or in consequence of his wilful fahifica- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 161 

tion. In estimating therefore tiie value of testi- 
mony, the process resolves itself into two 
inquiries. 

1st. Is the witness competent to give evi- 
dence in the instance before ns 1 or in other 
words, had he the means of fully knowing the 
fact which he reports ; — and was that fact one 
in relation to which he was likely, or not likely, 
to be deceived? As for example, if a witness 
declares that he has been robbed and beaten on 
the road ; this is a matter concerning which he 
could not have been mistaken ; and if any doubt 
rests upon the fact, it must attach to his veracity. 
But if he affirms that the man whom now he 
sees in court w^as the perpetrator of the deed, 
it is possible that, w^ithout any design to deceive, 
he may be in error ; and especially so, if the 
robbery took place after sun-set : on this point, 
therefore, we are not only to consider the vera- 
city of the witness, but his competency also. 

2d. If satisfied on these points, we next con- 
sider the cTiaracter of the witness, or judge of 
the probability of his being influenced by mo- 
tives which may lead him to a falsification of 
the fact. As for example, if a man has a great 
interest at stake in the determination of a con- 
troversy, there exists so strong a probability that 
he may yield to the temptation to misrepresent 



162 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

the truth, that his evidence is either not asked 
for at all, or is received wdth great caution. 
The veracity of a witness is estahhshed (chiefly) 
in the four methods following : — 

]st. His known or ordinarij character is ex- 
amined. Character is in fact the chief ground 
of confidence in Testimony. Falsehood is ab- 
horrent to a man of virtue ; and the cases are 
extremely rare in which those who possess a 
well-established reputation, as honest men, are 
found to forfeit it, how much soever their testi- 
mony may be opposed to their personal inter- 
ests. We believe a friend of whose integrity 
we have no suspicion, even when he affirms 
what may seem highly improbable. But a man 
of no character, or a known liar, receives 
scarcely any credit, even on the most ordinary 
occasions. Our reliance upon character is so 
firm, that nothing seems to us so incredible as that 
several men of good understanding, and tried 
integrity, should concur in affirming an untruth. 
The veracity even of men who lived in distant 
ages may safely and fairly be judged of, if his- 
tory has recorded the general course of their 
conduct ; or if their writings have descended 
to our times, and given, as it were, a portrait of 
their dispositions and principles. 

2d. We estimate, as far as we have the means 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 163 

of doing SO, what may be called the moral posi- 
tion of the witness, in relation to the facts 
of which he speaks : — that is to say, how 
those facts, or his testimony concerning them, 
affected, or was hkely to affect, his personal 
welfare. Even if we confide in his character, 
we shall feel a slight diminution of confidence, 
if this evidence was, in its tendency, highly ad- 
vantageous to the witness ; and on the contrary, 
even if we know nothing by other means of 
the character of the witness, we shall readily 
impute to him a good character, if we find him 
persisting in testimony which immediately ex- 
posed him to peril or disadvantage : — and then, 
if by some indirect channel, we are assured of 
his general integrity, it will be scarcely possible 
to entertain a doubt of his veracity. 

3d. The value of Testimony is, in most cases, 
easily estimated by comparing one part of it 
with another ; especially in points of a trivial 
or unimportant kind. The lesser circumstances 
of a story that has been invented to deceive, 
will seldom be found compatible, one with 
another. Nothing but the real consistency of 
truth, can give consistency to a long relation of 
facts. The minute particulars of place, and 
time, and persons, and accidents, can never be so 
calculated and arranged by a fabrication, as to 



164 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

remove every clew to the detection of the 
fraud. Testimony that is completely in ac- 
cordance with itself, is very rarely fomid to be 
untrue. 

4th. The conclusive method of detecting the 
false, and ascertaining the true, in matters of 
Testimony, is — The comparison of the evidence 
of independent witnesses. A set of false wit- 
nesses, whatever pains they may take in arrang- 
ing their evidence, never fail to be at fault in 
some notable instance. And much more is that 
probabihty increased, if they give their evidence 
without previous concert, or in an incidental 
manner, which admits of no contrivance. 
Again, if there are witnesses to the same fact, 
some of whom are opposed in interest to others, 
or who are absolutely unconnected, one with 
another, their concurrence must be held to place 
the matter beyond reasonable doubt. 

It is by these methods that Testimony is 
estimated in courts of justice, and that questions 
of property and of life, are determined: — and it is 
by a full and fair apphcation of the very same 
rules that the most important of all questions 
is brought to an issue — namely, that which re- 
lates to the Truth of Christianity. The Tes- 
timony which supports the great facts recorded 
by the Evangehsts and Apostles, is confirmed 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 165 

in each of the methods above mentioned, and 
by the combination of them all. Indeed it may 
boldly be affirmed that no fact whatever, in 
ancient history, is nearly so well and fully at- 
tested as is the Gospel history. If that history 
is rejected, then not only is all history an illu- 
sion, but the entire system of human affairs is 
removed from its foundation, and no man can 
rely upon anything but what is immediately 
present to his senses. The young reader is re- 
commended, both as an exercise of his powder 
of investigation, and as a means of establishing 
his rehgious principles, to apply y^*/* himself, the 
preceding four rules to the evangehcal history. 
He will not be at a loss to obtain the informa- 
tion requisite for doing so, if he refers to any 
of the w^ell-known works which exhibit at large, 
the Christian Evidences. 



THEORY 

Is sometimes distinguished from practice ; as 
thinking differs from acting : or as science differs 
from art. But in its strictest sense, the word 
signifies a system, or set of principles, intended 
to explain certain facts not as yet confirmed 
by demonstrative reasoning. A hy^Jothesis is a 
shigle supposition, relating to the cause of a 



166 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

particular effect. A theory is a complete set of 
suppositions, comprehending a hypothetical ex- 
planation of all the facts belonging to one branch 
of science. As for example — a hypothesis may 
be advanced relative to the luminous stream 
which attends a comet : or there have been 
several theories of the heavens, explaining all 
the appearances and movements of the hea- 
venly bodies, on different principles, as the 
Ptolemaic, the Copernican, and the Newtonian. 

TIME, 

Is duration measured, or divided, into equal 
parts; as distance is extension, so measured. 

TRUTH, 

Is the agreement of our notions with the 
reality of things ; or it is the agreement of pro- 
positions with the notions, or things, or facts, 
concerning which an affirmation is made. The 
word truth is often improperly employed, in a 
vague sense, as if there were an abstract exist- 
ence, somewhere to be found, which is inde- 
pendent both of propositions and of notions. 
But truth, as it is an agreement, or a sameness, 
implies necessarily, a thing, or notion ; and a 
representation, or affirmation concerning it. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 167 

Truth in propositions does not exist, unless 
the terms employed are understood in the same 
sense by the speaker, and by the person ad- 
dressed. As well utter a formal falsehood, as 
use a word in a sense which those to whom we 
speak do not suppose us to intend. 

In relation to the truth oi notions, or concep- 
tions, a distinction of some importance is to be 
observed, between a perfect and an imperfect 
agreement of our notions with the things that 
are the objects of them. The notion we form 
of a triangle, and of its properties, may be per- 
fect : — that is to say, complete as well as fault- 
less. But our notions of the operations of 
nature — of the constitution of our own minds, 
and especially of the attributes of the Divine 
Being, can never be better than imperfectly true : 
— for our knowledge on these subjects is very 
hmited. The notion which a child has of the 
moon, who would fain have it given to him as 
a plaything, is altogether false. The notion of 
the astronomer, who rightly estimates its size 
and distance, and calculates, with precision, its 
movements, is true — but imperfectly so ; inas- 
much as he knows little more of the moon than 
those mathematical facts. 

Such, too, are the notions which the chemist 
forms of the properties of bodies ; they are 



168 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

precise to a certain extent ; but beyond that 
point, are vague, or erroneous. It is important 
in all cases to discern, and ingenuously confess, 
the imperfection of our knowledge. This in- 
genuousness is now commonly exercised in all 
branches of natural science. But in matters of 
reUgion it is often much wanting, and not a few 
of the controversies which divide the Christian 
world would instantly disappear, or be held in 
abeyance, if things which surpass the range of 
our conceptions, or the limits of our actual in- 
formation, were seen and acknowledged to be, 
as they are, unknown, except so far as the bare 
affirmation of Scripture offers them to our as- 
sent, as facts partially revealed. All that is 
imagined, or dogmatically affirmed, beyond this 
limit, is not true, how nearly soever it may be 
connected with truth; but is positive error. 
To adhere firmly to what is known, and to 
reject all tho^o surmises and inferences by 
which the mind labors to fill up the vacant 
spaces in its systematic notions, is a prime part 
of wisdom . 



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